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| Evaluation of the Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program | 2013 |
| Evaluator: Dr Kondwani Chirambo (Ph.D). | Project Period: August, 2012 to December, 2013 |



**ACRONYMS**

ACP Alliance of Congress Parties

ABC All Basotho Convention

ADC All Democratic Corporation

AUM Africa Unity Movement

BAC Basutoland African Congress

BBDP Basotho Batho Democratic Party

BCP Basutoland Congress Party

BDNP Basotho Democratic National Party

BNP Basotho National Party

CCL Christian Council of Lesotho

CSO Civil Society Organisation

DC Democratic Congress

DPE Development for Peace Education

ECF Electoral Commissions Forum

EMB Electoral Management Body

EOM Election Observer Mission

GOL Government of Lesotho

IEC Independent Electoral Commission

LCD Lesotho Congress for Democracy

NAM Needs Assessment Mission

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NIP National Independent Party

PMS Performance Management System

SDP Social Democratic Party

SDC Sefate Democratic Congress

SDU Sefate Democratic Union

TOR Terms of Reference

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Responding to the promising but unprecedented outcome of Lesotho’s 2012 parliamentary elections which yielded a Tripartite Coalition Government, the UNDP commenced a nine-month program the same year ranged at achieving political consolidation and peaceful government transition.

While the results of the 2012 elections were widely accepted by stakeholders, and despite the emergence of the Tripartite Coalition Government ending four decades of single partysm, military rule, one-party dominancy and intractable post-election conflicts, the UNDP recognised the need to provide extensive capacity building support to the new establishment to improve this highly tenuous situation, in addition to its longstanding interventions aiming to deepen and consolidate democracy in Lesotho.

Building on previous technical support to the mediation efforts of the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) which began in earnest in 2009 after failed attempts by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the UNDP crafted the *Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program* supported by USAID. Three key projects were developed under this program to shore up areas of political and electoral governance, aspects of which constituted potential conflict flash-points. The program’s three strategic areas were:

1. Support for establishing a stable coalition government;
2. Review of the electoral institutions, processes and legal frameworks for immediate and longer term consolidation;
3. Strengthening processes of dialogue and mediation.

Aligned to the US Foreign Assistance Framework for democracy-based interventions, the project commissioned an end-of-term evaluation on 10-24 December, 2013 which sought to draw lessons, identify gaps and advance propositions for future interventions in the area.

Adopting a qualitative research methodology which employed in-depth and semi-structured interviews and extensive desk reviews, the evaluation engaged key informants in the Government of Lesotho, the Senate, the National Assembly, the CCL, Development for Peace Education (DPE), political parties and UNDP, in addition to undertaking a rigorous content analysis of a wide-range of documentation related to the project.

**Key Findings:**

As a result of UNDPs *Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program* the Government of Lesotho has reached a consensus on the implementation of a Performance Management System (PMS) to improve accountability and service delivery at ministerial and managerial levels of the executive. While discussions on the PMS are not new, it is noted that the initiative had stalled since the mid-1970s often occasioned by a pre-occupation amongst key interlocutors with systemic politicisation of the civil service aimed at power consolidation. The consequence of this was that Lesotho has not had an entrenched culture of holding civil servants accountable. Informants in this regard submit that the country’s relatively poor performance in addressing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was a reflection of a deficit in its governance architecture. However, in addition to action on the PMS, *Performance Agreements* have been drawn up for ministers, directors and managers within government departments as well as *Ministerial Strategic Plans* - a direct outcome of the training, technical input and knowledge products of the UNDP. While the PMS is not formally institutionalised, the necessary policy clearances and actions have finally been made, which government principals directly attribute to the UNDP project. In respect of this, the following are the specific key outcomes:

* *Institution of Ministerial Strategic Plans:* All ministries, except for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Health, [[1]](#footnote-1) had developed and submitted Strategic Plans as a direct result of the UNDP PMS workshops and technical support [Principal Secretaries’ Retreat, and Ministers’ Retreat] by the time of this evaluation.
* *Performance Agreements:* As a ‘first step’ toward comprehensive PMS, all senior officials – directors and managers in government had signed Performance Agreements, bringing accountability to bear at a personal level. The Ministers had also signed an agreement with the Prime Minister to ensure they delivered on their mandates.
* *Law Review:* These initial steps taken so far, have prepared ground for the review of the Public Service Act and Regulations to incorporate the PMS component.
* *Common understanding of coalition principles and development planning:* While indicating that more sustained technical support is required, principals in Government and political parties acknowledge that UNDP Retreats and technical support has assisted them to have a better grasp of intricacies and technicalities of coalition management[[2]](#footnote-2).

Despite this, the report notes that the lethargic pace of decision-making or ‘over-consultation’ in the Tripartite Coalition has tended to impact on the speed of implementation of this segment of the program which is couched under the rubric of *‘support for establishing a stable coalition’*.

While it is noted that the UNDP’s technical assistance to mediation processes in Lesotho predates the commencement of its 2012 program, the report underlines that technical support to the Heads of Churches of the CCL and civil society agencies under its *strengthening dialogue and conflict mediation* component, has leveraged the pre 2012 momentum and continued to strengthen essential skills in conflict analysis, consensus building, conflict identification, prevention and management. These skill-sets, evidently, have been instrumental in maintaining a stable government and in gradually building impetus toward consensus-based management of coalition matters. To this end, in the period under review, the Heads of Churches sustained their mediation efforts with political parties and coalition partners in the post 2012 period. Based on the analyses of beneficiary responses to interviews and a plethora of official records and related documents therefore, the report surmises that without the UNDP training, the Heads of Churches of the CCL and other civil society organisations might not have had the confidence to intervene at a technical level in the tense ‘high risk’ post 2012 phase. In addition, UNDP training raised civil society consciousness on professional approaches to conflict mediation and instilled the relevant skills, enabling the non-state actors to prepare technical reports for the Heads of Churches to appraise the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation [[3]](#footnote-3)on progress in the mediation process in Lesotho for instance. Further, UNDP support in the post 2012 period has also resulted in the institutionalisation of conflict mediation in CCL’s programming and to the ‘revamping’ of the CCL’s constitution, [[4]](#footnote-4)policy documents and strategic plans, to respond to the demands of contemporary political developments in Lesotho. This not only builds the foundations for a home-grown and sustainable mechanism but potentially, also, positions the CCL as the country’s foremost conflict mediation institution for the foreseeable future.

Interventions by the UNDP on the *Review of the electoral institutions, processes and legal frameworks* have led to deeper insights into the institutional challenges facing the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Lesotho. An evaluation of the 2012 electoral process commissioned by the UNDP unravelled the need for financial autonomy and operational independence for the IEC as well as the necessity to render the electoral management body accountable to parliament rather than the executive. The evaluation noted the lack of organisational capacity in administration, operational planning and information technology (IT), which ostensibly compromised IEC ability to deliver ‘technically perfect elections’. [[5]](#footnote-5)To this end, the knowledge gained by senior IEC officials from a UNDP sponsored study tour of Botswana, South Africa and Zambia has catalysed the country’s own ambitions toward the development of technologically advanced and integrated citizen and voter registration systems. However, the pace of these developments has been slackened by limited funds and unforeseen political occurrences. In this regard, this evaluation report identifies institutional and procedural impediments that have materialised affecting progress in this component of the program, such as impending by-elections in 2014, which have necessitated the use of the 2012 election registers and resulted in the temporary suspension of the re-registration of voters exercise. Secondly, the government dedicated time to fill two vacancies on the three-person Commission which arose as a result of the death of one Commissioner and the retirement of another. Lastly, there is apparent government intention to restructure the IEC which has delayed progress as such. Notwithstanding this development, the report underlines that none of these problems appear to compromise the ultimate completion of the re-registration exercise in the long term on the current indications.

UNDP expertise has also capacitated Members of Parliament (MPs) in relevant budget analysis and tracking skills and enabled the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Committee in the Senate[[6]](#footnote-6). Training in *budget tracking* and *budget analysis* has led to Portfolio Committees undertaking *quarterly* *reviews* – as opposed to yearly reviews - of the *national budget*. Committee reports demonstrate MPs’ capacity to communicate technical information, illustrating also, a qualitative improvement in the manner in which Portfolio Committees of Parliament interrogate budget issues and engage the public on the subject matter. In addition, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), on the basis of its reports, is demonstrating *reasoned approaches* to the scrutiny of the Auditor General’s Reports. Apart from developing Result-Based Work-plans, UNDP assisted the Senate to formulate the Terms of Reference (TORs) for the MDGs Committee and provided the necessary international exposure for its principals.

In relation to this, the evaluation finds that Cabinet has given policy clearance for the drafting of a Bill to enable the formation of the*Parliamentary Service Commission.* Key informants emphasise that the UNDP has been instrumental in catalysing action on the formation of the Parliamentary Service Commission to enhance the legislature’s operational autonomy. Presently, all staff of the Senate and the National Assembly falls under the auspices of the Ministry of the Public Service. A UNDP sponsored Study Tour of Canada for executive members of Parliament to examine the modalities of the country’s Parliamentary Service Commission was primed to further inform this process. While this positive development will likely have major ramifications for democratic accountability and the promotion of the principle of separation of powers, the report notes stakeholder indications that the process requires further technical support in the drafting of the Parliamentary Service Commission Bill, restructuring of the legislature and ‘job profiling’ to suit the proposed set-up.

Generally, this evaluation report identifies problems experienced by both the implementing agency and beneficiaries in executing their respective activities, most of which indicatively suggest that the complexities and slow pace of decision-making in coalition governing tend to create gridlocks, sometimes upsetting schedules. Further, the report highlights concerns by stakeholders about the sustainability of external support to Lesotho’s political consolidation processes citing the short-term nature of the current UNDP/USAID program and the volatile state of the global economy as potential threats.

The report enjoins the government and its cooperating partners to explore domestic options of funding in addition to soliciting international support. In view of the long history of apparent trust and confidence associated with UNDP by local stakeholders, the report emphasises the need to extend the current program to cover the period between 2013 and the next parliamentary elections in Lesotho. It is noted that such support, in its *problem definition and priority setting,* should not only build on the current successes, but also take into account the views of a wide-range of stakeholders, including youth [who face massive unemployment and may a source of instability]; women, special groups, and social and economic factors that may contribute to conflict at various levels of society. These propositions would, inevitably, require a wider dispensation of skills and knowledge on, inter alia, conflict mediation and coalition management amongst state and non-state actors.

# Introduction

# Evaluation Context

This evaluation was commissioned by UNDP on 10 December 2013 to identity the capacity gaps and challenges experienced during implementation of its USAID-supported *Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program.* The evaluation was ranged at furnishing recommendations based on the lessons learnt on the project. The outcomes are useful for both the implementing agency (UNDP) and the primary beneficiaries (local stakeholders) and secondary beneficiaries (cooperating partners) in the long term. In this regard, the evaluator was assigned to produce the following outputs:

1. Output 1. Inception Report/proposed methodology to undertake the evaluation [the proposal would include approaches to the review of documents, methods of data collection and review timelines for the evaluation and final report].
2. Output 2. Draft report and final report.

Given the time constraints, its scope and intensity, the Consultant proposed a feasible and substantive methodological approach which maximised on data collection, collation; synthesis and stakeholder engagement within the allotted 14-day period.

# Motivation for UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program

Since the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1993, Lesotho has conducted elections in five-year cycles, usually punctuated by hostilities and unease triggered by intra-party factionalism.

The current political insecurities born of a history of conflicted elections in Lesotho have been exacerbated by intractable intra-party fragmentation and the subsequent emergence of a fragile tripartite coalition government in the aftermath of the 2012 parliamentary polls.

This has necessitated the initiation of a nine-month program by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ranged at achieving political consolidation and peaceful government transition.

The program came in the wake of concerted efforts at conflict mediation by the Christian Council of Lesotho, (CCL), the southern African Development Community (SADC) and the UNDP in the post 2007 election period. However, the period was characterized by distrust and lack of collaboration between political parties, resulting in the withdrawal of the SADC appointed mediator, Sir Ketumile Masire in 2009. These developments notwithstanding, locally-driven CCL mediation processes, with UNDP and SADC support, continued to nurture an uncomfortable co-existence between political elites and contestants in the intervening electoral phases, including in the period before and after the 2012 parliamentary elections.

Although the May 26, 2012 elections were occasioned by a consensual endorsement of the outcomes by all political parties, the country experienced an unprecedented scenario, where no single party garnered enough votes to establish government. This development had no precedence in law to guide the principals on the stewardship of the nation thereafter, generating uncertainties and anxieties across the country.

Noting the lack of procedural or legal guidelines to rationalise the emergence of this tripartite coalition government; and taking into account the delicate and novel nature of this formation and the implications for national stability, the UNDP, with the support of USAID, fashioned a unique response seeking to generate best practices founded on reconciliation and mediation. It was envisaged that the precedent set by the current coalition government would positively impact upon other future formations of this nature and thereby contribute to sustainable peace and stability. The UNDP surmised that for maximum momentum and sustainability of the transition government to be attained, electoral processes and emerging trends needed to be reviewed, explicitly stated and expanded upon. [[7]](#footnote-7)

The purpose of UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program, supported by USAID, therefore, is to engender political consolidation and peaceful government transition in Lesotho by means of a capacity building project in 2012 which established vectors of technical assistance in three critical spheres of the state:

1. Support for establishing a stable coalition government;
2. Review of the electoral institutions, processes and legal frameworks for immediate and longer term consolidation;
3. Strengthening processes of dialogue and mediation.

It is also noteworthy that the goals of the Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program are consistent with the US Foreign Assistance Framework: *Governing Justly and Democratically for Political Competition and Consensus Building: Elections and Political Processes.* Long term US assistance for southern Africa seeks to support regional interventions that can stimulate integration anchored by democratic reforms and cross-pollination of best practice. In addition, it is noted that the aims of the Lesotho Consensus Building and Electoral Reform Program are in furtherance of the goals of the SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO). In addition to seeking to foster a peaceful, stable political and security environment, SIPO is ranged at consolidating democracy in the region, developing of principles governing democratic elections and ensuring acceptance of results and peaceful adjudication of post-election disputes.

# Overall Objectives and anticipated outcomes of project

## The overall objectives of UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program were four-fold:

1. To implement a program of electoral process review and reform through support to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC);
2. Management of the Coalition Government through political consolidation [executive and ministerial levels; and establishment of Performance Management System (PMS)];
3. Building on the successes of both the pre and post elections period mediation processes by integrating all stakeholders in mediation, dialogue and training processes;
4. Capacity development for parliament in Lesotho, during the high risk period.

**3.1.1** The project’s objectively verifiable indicators are described as follows;

* Increased number of political actors in Lesotho who understand and implement the basic principles of coalition government. [It was anticipated that there will be a significant improvement in the functional relationships between the various minority parties after the implementation of the project].
* Increased number of political parties and civil society actors who adopt reconciliation and mediation as a component of successful political transition. [The project sought to measure this indicator through the tenor and frequency of positive inter-party and government-civil society dialogues on key policy issues].
* Improved legal and procedural frameworks for future elections in Lesotho.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The project has a range of inter-related activities [defined in section 5] for each of the three components of the work which are framed to work toward the same end. The system dynamics of the three components and their inter-dependency were ascertained prior to the commencement of the evaluation. The specific indicators for each project component are attached to Appendix two.

##  Scope and evaluation category

The project was designed to operate from 2012 to December 2013 and has benefitted from various capacity inputs from technical experts in relevant fields directed at principals in government and parliament and the institutions governing elections.

In addition to taking into account the Terms of Reference, the three key components of the Lesotho Consensus Building and Electoral Reform Program and the UNDP evaluation and quality assurance standards, [[9]](#footnote-9)hence, the Consultant has constructed an evaluation matrix informed by the following considerations:

* That there is a possibility of the continuance of the project, hence the high premium placed on *implementation challenges (which include management processes),* *lessons learnt* and *recommendations (use of results)*. While the evaluation has somewhat been categorised as summative, its long term nature gravitates toward it being ***formative*** in context. By their very nature, formative evaluative research foreground the need for lessons learning and course correction, and may sometimes be misunderstood as being ‘negative’ because of the focus on *what could be done better*. As the project has operated for a little over one year, the Consultant assumes that the broad objectives set by the project managers were essentially long term. Primarily therefore, this can be categorised as an *implementation evaluation* ranged at determining what activities worked, and which ones did not, and for what reasons.
* Because the project arises from mediated election-based processes, and due to its delicate nature, the Consultant takes into account the *Guiding Principles for the Evaluation of Deliberative Democratic Perspectives[[10]](#footnote-10),* which emphasise the need to consider the interests, values, and views of the major stakeholders involved in the program or policy under review. The fundamental principles in this regard, are:

Overall, based on a considered review of the project purpose and documents, the Consultant has adapted an evaluation framework anchored on a set of five Performance Areas consistent with recommended models for evaluation research[[11]](#footnote-11).

 Given that the project seeks to draw ***lessons*** from which key interlocutors in the post-election management processes in Lesotho are able to act upon, the Consultant has prioritised the need to derive beneficiary perceptions of the relevance, timeliness, usefulness and the quality of the work rendered up until now. This approach will enable the evaluation to interrogate the design and implementation of the project and the manner and extent to which it enabled stakeholders to utilise the results.

The *unit of analysis* in this regard, is each strategic component of the UNDP Project juxtaposed to respond to the five key performance areas. The evaluation framework was adapted to suit the TORs as such (Table 1).

## Evaluation framework

Table 1: Evaluation Framework

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Performance Area 1:* Strategy and direction**  | ***Performance Area 2:* Management and processes** | ***Performance Area 3:* Outputs**  | ***Performance Area 4:* Uptake** | ***Performance Area 5:* Outcomes and impact** |
| Appropriateness of the interventions:Alignment with s/holder needs and prioritiesTimelinessResponsivenessInclusiveness | Progress: Has project been on track to meet its objectives?Influencing factorsImplementation challengesAdaptive management | Quality and credibility:Appropriate quality assurance systemImplementation of systemCredibility of the work / results | Use of results:Consensus around use of resultsUptake of proposed electoral/legislative reformsUse in national plans and among stakeholdersCapacity gapsRole of the designRole of implementation | Contributions to change:AchievementsAlignment with expectationsUnintended consequencesPositive and negative outcomes |
| Quality of the designLogic and coherenceInnovation | What worked, what did not work and why?Partner/beneficiary selection and capacitiesOwnership |  |  | Sustainability ofProject Long-term plansImplications for the futureLessonsExploring synergiesRegional vs. nationalRole of UNDP |

## The evaluation process/Time-frames

1. 14 days have been set aside for the execution of this evaluative research, including travel, preparations, tools development, appointments, desk reviews and field work. The process is illustrated in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Phases of the Evaluation Process**

**Phase 1:**

**Preparation**

**Phase 2:**

**Field mission**

**Phase 3:**

**Analysis and synthesis**

 **Phase 4: Finalisation for use**

Submission of methodology/Inception Reports (11-12)

Desk Study/Document reviews/tools development/ field work

(12-18 December)

Finalisation and submission of report

(December 20-24, 2013)

(Meeting with UNDP/December, 10, 2013)

Data/analysis/draft report

(December 18 -20)

##  Methods

1. The methods employed for this project were informed by the strategic themes of the *Lesotho Consensus Building and Electoral Reform Program,* which seeks, inter alia, to draw substantive information on the impact of the activities undertaken so far. The program has entailed inputs from technical experts hired by UNDP to capacitate members of parliament and other stakeholders, review electoral laws/legal frameworks and catalyse dialogue and mediation processes. The program lends itself to the collection of rich textured stories, or *thick descriptions*, which would provide a substantial basis from which to draw lessons. This approach is consistent with the tradition of qualitative evaluation which generally aims to collect information and generate findings that are useful for policy makers. To this end, comprehending the program’s and participants’ experiences was critical to the extent that their narratives illuminate the processes and outcomes of the program for decision makers to act upon.
2. The second determinant for the choice of the methods proposed here is the nature of formative of the evaluation – which requires a plethora of emerging lessons to inform a consolidated, perhaps even better calibrated programme going forward. Based on these considerations, this evaluation employed qualitative methods, which, depending on the context, may also utilise quantitative data. Through the use of *inductive and deductive qualitative analysis,* the Consultant sought to discover *patterns* *(pattern-matching)* in the emerging data which assisted in *explanation building*. [[12]](#footnote-12)Deductive analysis in evaluations tends to involve the analysis of data employing the program’s logical framework, while inductive logic demands flexibility and exploration. A convergence of the two analytical approaches has complementary value, it can be asserted. By examining recurring regularities in the data, the Consultant sorted the patterns into categories and determined what emerging issues belonged to particular themes (Convergence). Similarly, external heterogeneity was assessed by determining the degree to which the variations in the categories were distinct. The Consultant therefore asserts that this evaluation exercise aimed to achieve *substantive significance* [[13]](#footnote-13)as opposed to *statistical significance*. The study employed the following forms of data collection:
3. **Desk Study/Document Review:** Voluminous raw data was analysed, including parliamentary records, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee reports, evaluation reports, legislation, training modules, project documents, memoranda, Coalition Agreements, written responses to open-ended surveys and organised into digestible narratives aligned to the major themes and categories. Illustrative case examples were also drawn through content analysis of relevant documents to provide deeper understandings, identify patterns and sub themes, which were useful for framing discussions in the course of the project.
4. **In-depth, open-ended interviews**: Typically, the evaluation exploited key informants to garner authoritative overviews of an institutional nature: Interviews with the IEC, Speaker/senior parliamentarians, political leaders/coalition partners, Church and civil society thought leaders yielded high value information. In all instances, and at the insistence of this Consultant, interviews were substantiated by reports, records, Minutes of strategic policy documents from the same informants.
5. **Semi-structured Interviews:** a *semi-structured questionnaire* addressing, as necessary, the relevant project themes, was designed and administered to the Principal interviewees to ensure that responses were comparable in most respects. Respondents were cross-sectorally chosen [in consultation with UNDP]. However, the Consultant adopted a *stratified purposive sampling approach* to ensure that opinions of particular interest groups Could be compared to other groups, where necessary (e.g. political parties, vs civil society perspectives; or the impressions of each coalition partner of the value and benefits of the program – if any - thus far).[[14]](#footnote-14)

## Quality assurance

1. As alluded to earlier, the evaluation embraced a set of internationally recognised evaluation standards, particularly the UNDP evaluation and quality standards, the *Guiding Principles for the Evaluation of Deliberative Democratic Perspectives, the African Evaluation Guidelines[[15]](#footnote-15), and the Qualitative Evaluation Checklist[[16]](#footnote-16).*

##  Constraints and challenges

The evaluation was challenged by the short time frame allocated for what was essentially a broad-based program of national remit. The evaluation was undertaken during the festive period and this impacted on the availability of some of the stakeholders. The risk factors necessitated a slight change in the methodology, in consultation with the UNDP Lesotho Office, opting to optimise the value of key informants, workshop participants and document review as such. To this end, the key informants were chosen with great care, as each was capable of authoritatively providing a broad overview of the project component from they benefitted. In addition, each of the key informants had over-sight mandates in their respective institution or sector, and able to back up their assertions with documentary evidence in most respects.

# Historical Context

A Constitutional Monarchy since independence from Britain in 1966, Lesotho has been scarred by a complex of post-election disputes, conflict, single party dominance, coups and military government – all contributing to protracted political instability and the present fragile parliamentary democracy. [[17]](#footnote-17)

The hallmark of Lesotho’s June 8, 2012 parliamentary elections was that it yielded a Tripartite Coalition Government, ending the era of one-party dominancy which characterised the country since the return of plural democracy in 1993.

For the first time in almost 20 years, there was a modicum of consensus on the veracity of the outcome of national elections, a departure from the conflict and tensions that occasioned the country’s previous plural contestations in 1965, 1998, 2002 and 2007.

Following the post-election political crises of 1998 which was typified by the military intervention by South Africa and Botswana [ostensibly to stabilise the country], regional and international efforts further shored up local initiatives to re-model the country’s First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system which was identified as a key contributor to disenchantment amongst losing parties. Inherited from British colonialism, the winner-take-all system, as it is sometimes termed, tends to yield dominant party systems, often resulting in losing contestants not gaining any seats in parliament at all, regardless of the proportion of votes they may have garnered[[18]](#footnote-18).

The introduction of the Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) system in the aftermath of the 1998 polls was aimed at compensating for this discrepancy by taking into account the proportion of votes gained by smaller parties, thereby providing an equitable platform for inclusive governance[[19]](#endnote-1). The unintended consequence of the MMP, first used in the 2002 elections, was that it spurred the emergence of an unprecedented *party coalition phenomenon* where political parties exploited the lacuna in the legal and constitutional framework to work purportedly as integrated entities in order to garner more PR seats – and dominate government. The ‘legality’ of these alliances in contesting constituency and PR seats became the source of much controversy in the run up to the 2007 snap elections, generating intense debate and anxieties hence.

The confluence of opinion, at present, appears to suggest that the underlying problems regarding how seats were allocated under the MMP and the arguments about whether coalitions were to be treated as integrated entities or not, have since been somewhat cleared by further interpretation of the law by the High Court in Maseru.[[20]](#footnote-19)

For the outcome of the May 26, 2012 elections was such that no single political party emerged as an outright winner. This development had no precedence in law or procedure, raising fears that the country’s history of intractable intra-party and inter-party conflict might conspire to undermine peace and stability once again.

The supposed fragility of the Tripartite Coalition (All Basotho Convention (ABC), Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and Basotho National Party (BNP) hence necessitated the crafting of a number of inter-related interventions by the UNDP, supported by USAID, to help the country achieve a smooth transition in government and parliament and enable consensus-based electoral reform and sustain peace and stability. It is important to note that in the broader scheme of things, the formation of the Tripartite Coalition was lauded by analysts as exemplary because the three political parties came together willingly. [[21]](#footnote-20)Conversely, it has been argued, Coalitions and Governments of National Unity (GNU) formed in other African countries were ‘forced’ by external forces seeking to ensure stability.

It is also noted that *UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program*, which commenced in August 2012,was not the first attempt at stabilising and consolidating democracy in Lesotho. Support had been rendered to Lesotho through a number of inter-related initiatives since the beginning of the new millennium. In 2010, a multi-faceted project was launched following a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) by the UNDP conducted at the request of the IEC. Working within the framework the *Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance (CDGG) in Lesotho Programme* which started in 2009, Irish Aid, UNDP and the IEC worked collaboratively to craft a new Action Plan (AP), [[22]](#footnote-21)building on the ambition of a previous project – the Deepening Democracy Project (2006-2009) which was disrupted by the snap elections of 2007. The CDGG was fashioned to institutionalise and deepen democracy and good governance through improved electoral processes, effective functioning of parliament and enhanced promotion of human rights. The AP and CDGG therefore, had the mutual aim of supporting the IEC, civil society and the media on matters of institutional strengthening, electoral dialogue, legal reform, civic and voter education, transparency and promoting participation more generally[[23]](#footnote-22).

While the CDGG and the objectives of UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program are complementary in several ways, it is noted that they are not the same programme. The latter was initiated in August 2012 and only operationalized in October of the same year, to engender political consolidation and peaceful government transition in Lesotho by means of a capacity building project in 2012. The project established vectors of technical assistance to three specific spheres:

* Support for establishing a stable coalition government
* Review of the electoral institutions, processes and legal frameworks for immediate and longer term consolidation of the gains thus far attained
* Strengthening the processes of dialogue and mediation that played a key role in the achievements thus far.

The project was designed to operate from 2012 to December 2013 and has benefitted from various capacity inputs from technical experts in relevant fields directed at principals in government and parliament and the institutions governing elections.

# Detailed Program Review

The major components of the Project are captured in the table below [table 1]

|  |
| --- |
| ***Component 1: Electoral Process Review and Reform*** |
|  |
| 1) **Immediate post-electoral process support to the IEC.** |
| a. Engagement of an electoral expert and related support to advise IEC and stakeholders on post-electoral process and options, including consolidating acceptance of election outcome amongst stakeholders |
|  |
| Review of the electoral process by UNDP and the Lesotho IEC and provide recommendations and advocacy for institutional and electoral adjustment and reform, based on the review process. |
|  |
| b. Conduct a study of the 2012 electoral process, including the post-election formation of government events.  |
|  |
| c. Develop a process of review of the institutional arrangements (IEC), electoral process, and enabling legal and procedural framework. |
|  |
| 2) Recommendations and advocacy for institutional and electoral adjustment and reform. |
| a. Advise on possible immediate and long-term changes to institutional setup and related electoral  |
| processes, following a joint review with the IEC. |
|  |
| b. Goal is to provide these recommendations and sustain advocacy on these recommendations across the term of present parliamentary officeholders |
|  |
| ***Component 2:* Management of Coalition Government** |
|  |
| 1. **Capacity building for good governance, effective service delivery and** **accountability in Government**
 |
| Provision of technical assistance and advice on international practices on options for formation and management of a *functional and sustainable* coalition government, including such areas as allocation of control of ministries and departments, staffing of all areas of government, establishing a Performance Management Systems (PMS) to enhance accountability, developing policy positions across all coalition members, conflict resolution, and other aspects of coalition governing. |
|  |
| **2)      Mediation** |
| 1. Based on the relatively acrimonious discourse prior to the election and the history of political polarization in Lesotho, there is likely to be ongoing need for mediation between parties and between groups of supporters.
 |
| 1. Religious leaders in Lesotho society have played a central role in brokering agreements among politicians in crisis since the late 1980s. Their latest involvement in the run-up to the 2012 election has been perhaps the most significant of all. The program will support religious leaders to continue in their role of mediation. Training and other capacity building will be provided as well as limited technical and administrative capacity support for religious leaders.
 |
|  |
|  |
| ***Component 3: Capacity Development for Parliament***  |
|   |
|  **1)      Immediate post-electoral process support to the Parliament**  |
|  |
| * 1. The newly inaugurated 8th Parliament of Lesotho will be supported in its ongoing reform programme through training workshops, engagement of consultants to provide technical assistance, outreach activities, study tours and attachments to other Parliaments in the region.
 |
| A strong parliamentary institution will support elected representatives, including opposition parties to deliver constructive oversight, legislative and representative functions |
|  |
| * 1. Building on the election outcome of 30 women parliamentarians (25%). Training in gender mainstreaming will be provided to all members of parliament in Lesotho
 |
| 2. Interim Support to Parliament |
| (a) Parliamentary reforms through establishment of a Service Commission |
| (b) Establishment of a parliamentary research unit to provide evidence based research for members’ consumption and improved decision making |
| **Expected/Anticipated Results** |
|  |
| * An increased number of political actors in Lesotho who understand and can act on basic principles of coalition government.
 |
| * Improvement in the relationships among the various parties in the coalition.  The coalition must succeed in order for the GoL to remain legitimate.
 |
| * Increased number of political parties and civil society actors who adopt dialogue and consensus as a component of successful political transition.  We will measure this through the tenor and frequency of positive inter-party and government-civil society dialogues on key policy issues.
 |
| Improved legal and procedural framework for future elections in Lesotho. |
| A functioning independent Parliament that carries its mandate of oversight and making evidenced based decisions |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |

**5.1 Component One: Electoral Process Review and Reform:** this aspect of the program sought to review the electoral process and recommend areas of reform and improvements to the current legislative and administrative frameworks. Ultimately it aimed to advance evidence-based recommendations and advocacy to enable institutional and electoral adjustment and reform. [[24]](#footnote-23)

**5.1.2 Activity status:** The main activities in this regard were to engage a consultant to evaluate the 2012 National Assembly Elections; to familiarise senior IEC management, particularly the IEC working committee, to voter re-registration models in the SADC region. To this end, a study tour was undertaken to Botswana, South Africa and Zambia on elector re-registration. These three countries ostensibly, have integrated, electronic and bio-metric citizen and voter registration systems. **[[25]](#footnote-24)**

# Findings: Electoral Process Review and Reform[[26]](#footnote-25)

# Performance Area I – strategy and direction

## Relevance and timeliness

A striking feature of the electoral component of the project was the apparent involvement of IEC in *problem definition*. Key informants at the IEC underlined that the UNDP had provided assistance to the electoral management body, through ‘every election’, including technical support for the revision of the FPTP electoral model to an MMP system, as well as the amendment of the electoral law. The relationship between the two institutions has therefore a long history and the current projects will likely draw lessons from past interventions or certainly leverage their outcomes.

*‘They (UNDP) managed to level the playing field’.*

Key informants indicated that after the 2012 parliamentary elections, the IEC familiarised itself with election observer mission reports to identify the core problems with the electoral process and the institutional arrangements. Based on the confluence of opinion from international and regional electoral observers, the IEC realised that the central problem was the voter’s roll which was outdated and bloated with dead electors. In response to this, the IEC developed ‘a roadmap’ of activities for which it sought UNDP support. The roadmap included:

a) A study tour to other SADC countries operating more advanced systems

b) Training workshops

c) Consultative meetings with IEC district officials/staff.

These activities were then sponsored by UNDP. The activities, given this background, were considered relevant and timely by both the IEC and UNDP as such.[[27]](#footnote-26)

## Quality of the project design

As suggested earlier, the IEC, from its submission, was actively involved in the design of this component of the project and contributed to the identification of the problem and potential solutions. The IEC was generally pleased with the quality of the input from UNDP experts in this regard, and the elements that constituted the composite intervention. However, the key informants felt the programme *‘was too short’* and needed to have a longer term perspective, given that an electoral cycle requires extended support.

# Findings: Performance Area II – Management and Processes

## Progress

## Key factors influencing implementation and role of UNDP

As indicated earlier, the IEC suggests that it has had a long and fruitful relationship with the UNDP dating back to the post 1998 period. The IEC, in this regard, credits UNDP for sustained technical support in critical areas, including the review of the country’s electoral model – an important mechanism in conflict resolution and management processes. Their continued cooperation has yielded important recommendations for electoral reform from the UNDP commissioned evaluation of the 2012 electoral process. The pace of implementation of these recommendations however, has been affected by unexpected external factors, including impending local and national by-elections which will require the use of the older registers; as well as vacancies on the 3-person IEC Commission, which were in the process of being filled [full details explained in section 9.1 of this report] at the time of this evaluation.

# Findings: Performance Area III - Outputs

## Mechanisms for high quality work and outputs

To further the objectives of the Lesotho program, the UNDP indicated that it ensured that it hired professional and internationally accredited consultants in each specialised field. By all indications, the UNDP’s procurement procedures are stringent and require recruitment of experienced experts, usually, from its Global Roster of Democratic Governance Experts. The process entails public advertising, filtration of curriculum Vitae, expert referencing and interviews in addition to a demonstration of requisite skills and outputs by the successful candidates. [[28]](#footnote-27)This was an important aspect of the project as it also might determine absorption of results and uptake. None of the key informants or respondents has questioned the quality of the outputs in this evaluation. On the contrary, the program beneficiaries are unanimous in respect of the overall value, relevance and quality of the outputs.

# Findings: Performance Areas IV / V – Uptake, Outcomes, Impacts

## Achievements and unintended results

**Review of the electoral process:** an expert evaluation was undertaken by Stephen Beale, which identified capacity gaps and areas of adjustment. Among the key observations made by the Beale Report, was the new legal status of the IEC concerning its institutional independence, financial autonomy [[29]](#footnote-28)and clarity of roles and responsibilities of its commissioners. In the main, the expert noted that the IEC should be directly accountable to parliament to create a balance between independence and over-sight. He also noted the lack of organisational capacity in administration, operational planning and information technology (IT), which apparently compromised IEC ability to deliver ‘technically perfect elections’. Beale further highlighted the need to exercise caution in reviewing the role and status of IEC commissioners [i.e. whether they remain full time or part time, playing an active role in all processes]. Finally, he underlined that the support of the UNDP and development partners was crucial in contributing to transparent, credible and inclusive electoral processes in 2012.

**Re-registration Process:** Having identified the voter register as one of the core problems contributing to disputed elections in Lesotho, the UNDP, as stated earlier, sponsored IEC officials to a study tour of Botswana, South Africa and Zambia to gain knowledge on the development and management of technologically advanced and integrated citizen and voter registration systems in the region. According to key informants in the IEC, the study tour was very educational and enabled its officers to learn about how its neighbours managed and organised their voter’s rolls. The key recommendations emanating from the study tour by IEC officials of the three SADC countries were the following:

* + - The Lesotho electors’ register should be composed of data from the Ministry of Home Affairs therefore a national ID should be a pre-requisite for a voter to be registered.
		- The IEC should use Home Affairs data to purge dead electors [records of deceased voters should be displayed for public accountability purposes]
		- A national ID or voters’ card should be used for voting [security features should also be enhanced].
		- The current mobile registration hardware should be retained.
		- Voter registration should remain compulsory.
		- The IEC should improve its SMS and website facilities, including the introduction of a toll-free call centre, to enable rural communities to verify and correct details on the voters’ register, where relevant.[[30]](#footnote-29)

It was noted that although the three countries had directly compatible citizen and voter registration systems, there were slight variation in the manner in which they accredited voters. Zambia, for example, still used two cards:-an Identification Card (National Registration Card) in addition to a voter registration card. This was not the case for Botswana. Following the recommendation of the study tour, Lesotho had introduced National IDs. Voters in Lesotho would use both voter registration cards and national ID [instead of one document] to vote as such. According to UNDP, the project awaits the Home Affairs data centre to be completed in order to harmonize national data systems (section in charge of Identity documents/program evaluation). Key informants suggest however, that while they learnt a great deal from the tour, the re-registration and upgrading of the registers in Lesotho was affected by a number of unforeseen developments: Firstly, the re-registration of new electors was suspended due to the launch of the national IDs by the government. The IDs were to be used by voters in the registration exercise. Secondly, Lesotho is scheduled to hold 22 local by-elections and two national by-elections in February, 2014 which necessitated the use of the 2012 voter registers and the maintenance of the continuous registration process in the constituencies to hold elections. Lastly, two vacancies occurred on the IEC: The chairperson retired, a second commissioner died, leaving only a single official who did not constitute a quorum [2 commissioners form a quorum]. The recruitment of the 3 IEC Commissioners was finally completed in the second week of December, 2013. By the end of this evaluation, the three IEC positions had been filled. [[31]](#footnote-30)

## UNDP’s role and influence

The key informants underlined the importance of all the interventions undertaken by the UNDP under the 2012 nine month post-election support program and emphasised the critical nature of a new register, a viable citizen register and increased autonomy of the IEC. They noted that the credibility of future elections would be predicated on the perceived impartiality and operational autonomy of the IEC, in addition to its capacity to deliver valid results. In this regard, the IEC placed a very high premium on the implementation of the recommendations made by the UNDP sponsored Beale Report on electoral reform.

## Sustainability

As with much of this program, a longer term approach to technical and financial assistance will be required for the IEC in order to implement the full gamut of proposals It is noted for instance that part of the reason of the failure to launch the re-registration exercise was financial. There was apparently no budget under continuous registration to facilitate a fresh registration exercise.[[32]](#footnote-31) In addition, the newly appointed commissioners may need technical support, training and exposure through study tours. [[33]](#footnote-32) Such interventions will not be viable in the short term and will need innovative approaches to both fundraising and technical input to sustain over time.

**9.4 Conclusion [Component One: Electoral Process Review and Reform]**

Increasingly, it seems advocacy to enable the government to expedite the rendering of financial autonomy to the IEC will be necessary. For the foreseeable future, this may still require donor support as perceptions of the IEC by state actors appear to negate the dire need for an autonomous body. The IEC indicated for example that it was difficult to obtain government consensus on the financial and operational autonomy of the IEC citing ‘ignorance’ of its central role in elections amongst a number of key state actors as the reason. This notion, they noted, was demonstrated by resistance from government to salary increases for the IEC staff. It had been argued, allegedly, that the electoral management body was not an income generating enterprise and was therefore not deserving of professional salary scales. [[34]](#footnote-33) It seems apparent therefore that in addition to engendering capacity building and sustainable financing support to the IEC, the program will need to integrate an educational component for state actors to fully appreciate the imperative of a professional, accountable and financially and operationally autonomous electoral management body.

# Management of Coalition Government

**10.1** **Sub component 1) Capacity Building for Good Governance, effective service delivery and accountability in government.**: encompasses one main aspect, that is, the provision of technical assistance and advice on international practices on options for formation and management of a functional and sustainable coalition government.

**10.2 Activity status**: A retreat for members of cabinet and Principal Secretaries was held in Berea District from June 17 to 19, 2013[[35]](#footnote-34). The aim of the activity was to facilitate reflection on the ministerial operations of the government of Lesotho, taking cognisance of long standing concerns around accountability, service delivery and good governance more generally. A second workshop on *‘Coalition Building and Strengthening the Role of Political Parties in Parliament of Lesotho’*, was held on 11-13 December, 2013, in Lesotho addressing a) coalition bargaining and negotiation b) coalition agreement c) managing coalitions d) developing a communication and monitoring and evaluation for coalition governments and e) parliamentary groups and parties. The workshop included ministers, MPs and senior political party officials.

It is notable, from the review of the program, that the emergence of a Tripartite Coalition necessitated greater urgency and focus on *common problem definition*, *common problem resolution* and common *problem solving* within the context of the coalition. In addition to endeavouring to foster a common understanding of the coalition priorities, the retreat focussed on the roles of Ministers and their deputies, Principal Secretaries – and the steps required to ensure accountability and delivery on the strategic plans. Building trust and improved relations within government was prioritised in addition to foregrounding effective service delivery and people-centred government. The 57 participants included the Right Honourable Prime Minister Thabane. To the same end, a workshop was held in Leribe on 6-8 February (opened by the Minister of Public Service) for the introduction of Performance Management in the Government of Lesotho (GOL). Participants were the Government Secretary (Head of the Civil Service), Principal Secretaries and Planning Directors from the key ministries, departments and agencies of the GOL. The workshop was followed by a study tour/planning visit to the regional service centre of UNDP in Johannesburg on 11-15 March, 2013. The main aim of the activity was to cross pollinate with peers who had implemented PMS in East and Southern Africa; as well as engage peers on matters of innovation, knowledge and capacity development. In addition, the tour aimed to explore opportunities for the capacitation of the Lesotho Institute for Public Administration and Management. [[36]](#footnote-35)

# Findings: Management of Coalition Government

* 1. **Performance Area I – strategy and direction**

## Relevance and timeliness

*‘Before UNDP came in, there was always talk about PMS but no implementation’, PS, Public Service Ministry, Government of Lesotho.*

Key government informants and official records reinforce the notion that the public service in Lesotho has been dogged by problems of service delivery for several decades. While there has been intermittent discussion on the need for a Performance Management System (PMS) since 1975 - instability, a lack of political will and lack of commitment conspired to undermine progress in this sphere. The consequence of this was that Lesotho has not had an entrenched culture of holding civil servants accountable. It is also significant to note that the Government of Lesotho is the largest employer in a country with limited human development opportunities. To this end, respondents allude to the tendency toward nepotism and clientalism within the state, which, they insist, has been evident with every regime. [[37]](#footnote-36) Informants in this regard submit that country’s relatively poor performance in addressing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was a reflection of a deficit in its governance architecture.

Principal political actors were also emphatic in underlining the importance of UNDP’s coalition building intervention and specifically the introduction of a PMS in government. While it is evident from both UNDP’s and Government responses to this evaluation that the PMS initiative should have come much earlier, it is noted that the prevailing circumstances since 1993, occasioned by unstable government and post-election conflicts, introduced a paralysis in state functionality, rendering such an intervention impracticable. Despite that a unit was set up in the Office of the Prime Minister (PM) ‘six or seven years ago’, [[38]](#footnote-37)nothing had been done until the UNDP intervention to institutionalise PMS in the Government of Lesotho. Notwithstanding the progress made toward a stable electoral democracy, it is noted that recent changes to the legal and constitutional framework in the post-1998 period, did not, inadvertently, factor in any concepts, reference or guidelines on coalition governance, therefore not only complicating coalition formation but also its management.

Taking this into account, it has been ascertained by this evaluation that the intervention of a PMS training and support was not only relevant, but also strategic as an essential measure to shore up a fragile coalition government and commit the principals to effective service delivery. It is noted further by key interlocutors that collaboration within the coalition needed to be informed by a set of common values and common tools to ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities, as well as promote adherence to the core values of democratic governance – particularly accountability, transparency and responsiveness.

## Quality of the Project design

As earlier noted, the Lesotho Project was not the first UNDP/donor intervention on governance undertaken in Lesotho in the past 15 years. Prior, the CDGG – a collaboration between Irish AID, UNDP and IEC - was initiated in 2009 covering an expansive set of activities within the realm of governance. Cognisant of the complementary nature of the projects, the UNDP Lesotho project sought to focus on areas of high priority, which were not succinctly covered by the CDGG. Although the intervention has received substantial appreciation from respondents, it is noted that key informants insist that the interventions should be considered preliminary and will require a more sustainable, continuous approach. Generally however, this component of the project was considered to have met the immediate of needs of the country, despite its impromptu nature.

# Findings Performance Area II – Management and Processes

## Progress and Key factors influencing implementation

## At the time of evaluation, the Project was completing a compact agenda of activities to maintain its nine-month trajectory toward meeting its objectives. It is noted that the project management worked within the set time-frames, although specific activities were compromised largely by exogenous factors. This point is highlighted by both beneficiaries and project managers of UNDP, whose work was sometimes delayed by the lethargy of decision-making processes and complexities of the Tripartite Coalition Government. Firstly, poor coordination within the coalition impacted on the ability of project management to expeditiously execute activities as planned. [[39]](#footnote-38) Secondly, and more fundamentally, ‘*over-consultation’* within government held back progress in some respects. Respondents spoke of *‘certain ministries belonging to certain parties’ and* therefore, the need for a measured approach to consensus-building over matters of priority with government. In this regard, it was noted that the workshop on coalition building was supposed to be held in November 2012 but was only held in December, 2013. [[40]](#footnote-39) Secondly, a sense of caution was required to ensure there was a confluence of opinion within government on the relevance and appropriateness of certain interventions.

### Role and Influence of UNDP

Key informants from the state have emphasised the need for donors/UNDP to act as a collective in meeting the governance needs of Lesotho. It was particularly underlined by the Principal Secretary in the Public Service that greater value may arise from a better focussed intervention which collapses the goals of these institutions into a single program. The dominant view in this evaluation suggests that the UNDP’s role, influence and management of the immediate post-election support process was generally well appreciated

# Findings: Performance Area III - Outputs

## Quality of work and outputs

It is noted that to achieve its objectives of establishing a functional PMS system, the UNDP hired professional and international consultants in each related field [as per their establishment procurement procedures, noted earlier]. The UNDP’s modules, inter alia, endeavoured to enable a common understanding of coalition principles and shared experiences from Kenya, South Africa and New Zealand on the workings of the PMS. The result of this approach was that recommendations made by the experts in this component of the capacity building programme, were largely acted upon by government or certainly elicited a seemingly positive response. These included recommendations made by UNDP experts on the introduction of a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, Performance Agreements, the fore-grounding of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in development planning and the establishment of a Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) [which will be highlighted in the impact section of this framework]. The related intervention *‘Coalition Building and Strengthening the Role of Political Parties in Parliament of Lesotho’* held on 11-13 December, 2013, in Lesotho also provided empirical evidence of participants’ satisfaction with the quality, relevance and strategic nature of the course, as 91% (10 of 11 participants, senior party officials and MPs) indicated in a post workshop feedback. [[41]](#footnote-40)

The overall impression generated by key informants, respondents, project documents and evaluations, minutes, therefore suggests that the beneficiaries of this component appreciated the financial and technical support rendered for an initiative that had been on the drawing board for more than four decades. In this sense, the UNDP has been cited as the central agency in coordinating and leading the PMS project.

# Findings Performance Areas IV / V – Uptake, Outcomes, Impacts

## Achievements and unintended results

As stated, this component of the program specifically addressed the need for accountable and responsive government and identified the introduction of PMS as a vital instrument to achieving this goal. While the intention for the introduction of PMS appears to have existed as far back as 1975, the initiative lacked political will and commitment; and may have been further compromised by unstable and undemocratic government between 1971 and 1993. The preoccupation with political in-fighting side-lined the country’s development agenda and the need to develop requisite tools to ensure accountable governance and effective service delivery. Based on the analyses of data from official documents, minutes, project reports and key informants, the evaluation surmises that the 2012 UNDP Lesotho program has made a substantial systemic impact on progress toward establishing PMS. While the PMS is not formally institutionalised, the necessary policy clearances and actions have finally been made, which government principals directly attribute to the UNDP project. The following are the key outcomes:

* **Institution of Ministerial Strategic Plans:** All ministries, except for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Health, have developed and submitted Strategic Plans as a direct result of the UNDP PMS workshops and technical support [PS retreat, and Ministers Retreat].
* **Performance Agreements:** As a ‘first step’ toward comprehensive PMS, all senior officials – directors and managers in government has signed Performance Agreements, bringing accountability to bear at a personal level. The Ministers have also signed an agreement with the Prime Minister to ensure they delivered on their mandates. These were piloted after the UNDP training. [[42]](#footnote-41)
* **Annual PMS Workshop endorsed:** Because of the success of the Cabinet Retreat,, there has been commitment by Ministers to have a PMS workshop annually. [[43]](#footnote-42)
* **Law Review:** The process will now entail the review of the Public Service Act and Regulations to incorporate PMS [including rewards, sanctions]. The activity will require funds to hold consultative workshops to seek stakeholder inputs.
* **Common understanding of coalition principles and development planning**: It is acknowledged by Principals in Government and political parties that UNDP Retreats and technical support have assisted them to have a better grasp of intricacies and technicalities of coalition management. Each party for example had to quote the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) to set its own priorities [they were able to recognise the linkages between NSDP and their own Strategic plans].
* **Millennium Development Goals:** The workshop provided an improved understanding of the development challenges Lesotho faced as a nation. For example, it brought to the fore that the country was under-performing on some MDGs [poverty, child mortality, HIV/AIDs].[[44]](#footnote-43)

## Role and influence of UNDP

It is critical to state at this point that the activities that were directly attributed to UNDP by key informants, such as the Cabinet Retreat and the Principal Secretaries Retreat; can be correlated to very specific outcomes, already highlighted in the preceding section. The Consultant’s view, therefore, is that UNDP retains a central, highly influential and instrumental role in governance support processes in Lesotho. Though challenged by coalition inertia, the UNDP has, up to this point, demonstrated evidentially, that its coalition building workshops for the state have catalysed a will, if not a more informed approach to developing a functional PMS.

# 13.3 Conclusion:[Management of Coalition Government].

This activity has produced tangible results, including tools and knowledge products which have the potential to transform Lesotho’s governance profile in the long term. The critical factor is that knowledge building interventions have inter-faced well with practical applications in UNDP’s support, enabling the normative aspects of the workshops to translate into the development of the country’s first serious attempt at implementing a PMS in the Public Service. The central role of the UNDP in all this is paramount, as illustrated by the beneficiaries themselves. The critical matter to be explored however, is one of sustainability: i.e. the extent to which Lesotho is able to harness local resources to shore up external interventions, in order to ensure that the efforts are not compromised in the long term. Through this evaluation, the Public Service Ministry, for instance, made a plea for the UNDP to assist it develop a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework because Lesotho had no capacity or the resources to develop the tool at the moment.[[45]](#footnote-44)

#  Sub component (2) Mediation; [involves mediation between political parties and groups of supporters; and support religious leaders to continue in their role of mediation].

**15.1 Activity status:** The UNDP engaged the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) at three levels: a) strategizing b) organisational development 3) mediation. Recognising the central role of the leadership of the CCL, the project managers report that UNDP continued to raise awareness about the fragile political situation in Lesotho, through a series of briefings – wherein- strategies on addressing potentially challenging issues were discussed. The UNDP had however identified a major gap in what it terms ‘the organisational functioning’ of the CCL, which included an outmoded constitution, vague job descriptions, indistinct organisational and decision-making structures. Despite this, it was noted that the clergy remained the only credible and acceptable mediators in Lesotho. To assist with systems strengthening, the UNDP engaged experts from the Centre for Accounting Studies in Maseru who had begun re-modelling constitutional and organisational frameworks in 2013. Regarding mediation, a training workshop on mediation skills was convened by the Lesotho Council of NGOs on March 12-14, 2013 at the UN House to train 16 participants. A second workshop was scheduled for CCL leaders, including a series of training workshops for civil society later in the year. The UNDP also trained the staff of the Development Peace Education (DPE) as part of its capacity building in mediation skills for the member organisation so of the Lesotho Council of Non- governmental Organisations. Finally, the UNDP proposed the establishment of the National Peace Architecture to entrench the culture on home-grown initiatives.

# Findings: Mediation.

# Performance Area I – strategy and direction

## Relevance and timeliness

UNDP’s support to mediation processes in Lesotho predates the commencement of its 2012 program. As stated earlier, after the failure of the SADC mediation mission headed by President Masire in 2009, the countryexperienced further tension as a result of disputes over the allocation of PR seats and the position of leader of the opposition. By their own admission, the Heads of Churches and the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) [[46]](#footnote-45)as well as other civil society organisations under the umbrella of the Lesotho Council of NGOs, were unprepared for the technical aspects of mediation that the situation entailed.

Although the CCL’s role in mediation is alluded to in Article 11.1 of its constitution, the function is largely tailored to the settling of disputes amongst members. Initially, the Heads of Churches, with the CCL Secretariat and DPE as its technical units, leveraged their moral authority to facilitate political dialogue. However, their shortcomings were soon evident. The key informants in this regard described UNDP’s acceptance of the use of its offices as a ‘neutral’ venue for the cross-political party dialogue as an important step in securing buy-in into the process by stakeholders and cementing the CCL’s position as an arbiter. Further support from UNDP included technical assistance and a budget to sustain the mediation efforts. According to the primary beneficiaries (CCL and DPE), the involvement of the UNDP in its planning also helped NGOs convince political actors to re-open dialogue after the Masire debacle. This was because UNDP was perceived to have ‘more legitimacy and sense of neutrality’ by the key interlocutors. [[47]](#footnote-46)In the past, UNDP technical expertise had assisted Lesotho to understand and appreciate the MMP modalities, the previous electoral model having contributed immensely to the 1998 post-election conflict. [[48]](#footnote-47)

*More than any other aspect of the project, therefore, the* ***Mediation*** *component of the program lays claim to success long before the UNDP 2012 program was initiated.*

However, there are specific elements which lend themselves to scrutiny in respect to this evaluation which are directly related to the post 2012 interventions. These will be highlighted in the succeeding sections.

## Quality of the Project design

In general, there is a confluence of opinion amongst in the CCL and DPE of the relevance and quality of the project design in this regard. Both the CCL and the DPE spoke highly of the training content provided by the UNDP in Conflict mediation which included:

* Conceptualisation of conflict
* Different ways of handling conflict;
* Conflict analysis;
* Case studies.

The beneficiaries also illustrated a variety of ways in which the quality of the mediation workshops harnessed their conflict mediation skills. However, the CCL raised some important issues in regard to the project design which may bode well for the future. While the DPE seemed contented with the project matrix, the CCL noted that the program was ‘too reactive’ and that ‘it was hastily put together’. The design should have involved all stakeholders including, political parties, chiefs, LCN, CCL national and regional structures, women groups, women’s leagues, youth [who are prone to political manipulation, violence, crime and unemployment, crime etc.]. In addition, the CCL believe the project could have benefitted greatly by including the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce [who, they indicated, lost billions of Maluti in the 1998 post-election conflict]. The CCL contention is that there are several variables that should be considered in the fashioning of a comprehensive response to conflict in Lesotho and they include political, economic, social and cultural factors. The youth bulge and high unemployment; the state of health and social programming and the marginalisation of special groups, including women, should all have been included to be able to address all the relevant antecedents that influenced politics and conflict. The suggestion by CCL, as the key actor in mediation, does imply that not only is a better resourced program necessary, but that future interventions must seek to encapsulate a diversity of actors, interests, and factors in order to holistically address the underlying causes of conflict.

# Findings: Mediation

# Performance Area II – Management and Processes

## 17.2 Key factors influencing implementation

The CCL mediation meetings brought together all 18 parties (inclusivity being one of the principles taught). There were at least 15 dialogue events in the pre-election phase after President Masire left. It is noted also that SADC continued to provide financial support to CCL along with UNDP.

However on the UNDP 2012 post-election support program, the CCL had held one meeting with political parties at the time of this review According to key informants, the second meeting had not materialised because it was proving difficult to bring all three coalition parties together [the Prime Minister has not had time, CCL noted].

Expressing concerns over the urgency of the matter, the CCL indicated that it had noticed some ‘cracks’ in the coalition which needed to be dealt with before they got out of hand[[49]](#footnote-48). Although a Joint Programme of Action was developed by the coalition partners, party extremists on both sides were, allegedly, pushing partisan rather than the coalition agenda, the CCL noted. This was contributing to delays in service delivery-. There were social issues of unemployment, violence, crime and health that needed urgent attention [as per electioneering promises]. The ‘party agenda’ phenomena, the CCL maintained, had impacted on the implementation of the project as such.

### Role and influence of UNDP

Based on information from key informants, project documents, project evaluations and official reports, it is evident that UNDP technical support brought skills in conflict analysis, consensus building, conflict identification, facilitation of dialogue from the period between 2009 to date. The UNDP held a number training workshops which proved extremely important to the outcome of the dialogue process and the peace and stability that ensued going into the 2012 elections. It is stated categorically by the CCL and the DPE that without the UNDP training, the Heads of Churches might not have had the confidence to intervene at technical level and continue these activities into the 2012-2013 periods.

The UNDP employed experts in the fields of conflict mediation who imparted essential skills to civil society and the CCL. It is noted that the DPE had only one officer skilled in mediation before UNDP training. Presently, there are 6 officers [DPE has a full staff complement, 16]. Similarly, the CCL noted that 5 of its Heads of Churches were initially trained; but up to 25 regional leaders were to be trained by 2013 year end. In both quantitative and qualitative terms, therefore, beneficiaries acknowledge the central and critical role that the UNDP capacity building and technical support has played in increasing knowledge and capacity for conflict mediation and contributing subsequently to stable government in Lesotho.

# Findings: Performance Area III - Outputs

## Institutional support to CCL

Further to its own quality assurance mechanisms elucidated in section 8.1 and the training on mediation, the UNDP provided technical support to help CCL develop a new constitution, policy documents and strategic plans, ensuring consistently high quality work. The CCL conceded that its documents were outdated and needed ‘revamping’. Above all, CCL resolved that the constitution needed amendment. To this end, UNDP hired a consultant to assist the CCL write a new constitution, develop and strategic plan, undertake an organisational capacity assessment and produce recommendations. The CCL indicated that it needed to reposition itself to meet emerging challenges of governance and development in Lesotho, which it has begun to identify within the Tripartite Coalition in society more generally. The UNDP consultant raised issues on the organisational structure, decision-making, over-sight, the need for roles and responsibilities to clarified between the CCL Secretariat and the Executive Committee [CCL Conference elects executive committee from amongst delegates]. In the current constitution, the Executive Committee was considered the supreme administrative arm. With UNDP support, an Organisation Capacity Assessment (OCA) was done and a strategic plan devised.

##  Challenges and constraints

As a direct consequence of the UNDP program, the CCL was planning to institutionalise conflict mediation: It has a programme on good governance and human rights where peace building and conflict resolution and mediation would be placed. However, CCL has 10 regional structures in the 10 districts of Lesotho. The key informants indicate that the regions would, in future, need conflict mediation skills to deal with conflict of a political, economic, social nature: - disputes of land, grazing, cattle, water and resources occurred regularly at district/community levels, the CCL noted.

The DPE also raised an important aspect for future programming; the key informants indicated that the UNDP-appointed facilitator to the pre-election process was sometimes unable to comprehend proceedings in Sesotho, thereby missing out on nuances and atmospheric aspects of the workshops, which were critical to reaching a reasoned conclusion. DPE recommended that consultations with stakeholders before facilitators are appointed would be extremely helpful in future.

# Findings: Performance Areas IV / V – Uptake, Outcomes, Impacts

## Achievements and unintended results

In general, evidence shows that with the UNDP technical support, the CCL and Development Peace Education (DPE) were able to sustain dialogue for a two years period resulting in political parties agreeing to constitutional amendments to resolve the seats allocation and the issue of leader of the opposition. This support materialised in the form of financing, technical support, facilitation and the provision of facilities (venues).

In the 2012 period, the UNDP decided to extend technical skills to all relevant stakeholders in the post 2012 period, starting with the Heads of Churches, followed by the CCL Secretariat and DPE. This process was building upon the pre-2012 capacity building already started by UNDP. Further training was scheduled for 28-31 December, 2012, with church leaders, which will included the 5 Heads of Churches and 25 other church officials from the districts. The outcomes of these related interventions can be measured in the number of mediation workshops held by the trained primary beneficiaries (CCL, DPE) and their impact on secondary beneficiaries (political parties, coalition partners etc). It was also envisaged to be measured qualitatively, in terms of the legislation or policy/strategy documents directly attributable to the program.

On the basis of the data available to this evaluation, the following outcomes were evident:

* UNDP technical support brought skills in conflict analysis, consensus building, conflict identification; facilitation of dialogue to the CCL and DPE, two principal actors in the pre and post 2012 election mediation processes. This result is attributable to both the CDGG and the Lesotho 2012 program as the activities were uninterrupted and mutually reinforcing. In the pre-2012 period, UNDP held training workshops which proved extremely important to the outcome of the dialogue process and the peace and stability that ensued going into the 2012 elections. The key informants acknowledge that they would have been technically handicapped without the benefit of expert skills building in this regard.
* After 2012 elections, the CCL had held one meeting with political parties, coalition partners. The second meeting had not materialised because it was proving difficult to bring all three parties together. [[50]](#footnote-49)
* 25 members of CCL at regional level are scheduled for training in mediation skills, in addition to the 5 Heads of Churches, whose role was fortified in the 2012 pre-election phase as such.
* DPE increased the number of trained personnel from one officer, to 6 officers of 16 staff members, as a result of UNDP training.
* Post 2012 training raised CSO consciousness on professional approaches to conflict mediation. Skills imparted to DPE helped CSOs to adopt a non-confrontational stance on national issues [and were able to diffuse tensions amidst groups such as Coalition of the Concerned (CCO) for example].[[51]](#footnote-50)
* Mediation skills from UNDP training were applied by the DPE to the tourism sector, making actors understand conflict dynamics. The skills helped CBOs to formalise ideas about conflict resolution in their constitutions.
* As a result of UNDP technical support, the CCL was at an advanced stage of developing a new constitution, [[52]](#footnote-51)policy documents and strategic plans, which are expected to transform and consolidate its role as an institution of mediation in Lesotho.[[53]](#footnote-52)
* As a result of the UNDP intervention, the organisational structure and decision-making processes of the CCL are to be re-modelled and streamlined to meet the challenges of the present-day Lesotho. It is expected that the exercise will lead to clarification of roles and responsibilities between the CCL Secretariat and the Executive Committee.
* With UNDP support, an Organisational Capacity Assessment (OCA) was done and an Action Plan [[54]](#footnote-53)conceived by the CCL.

## Sustainability

While the success of the post-election interventions and a fairly large part of the pre-election milestones have been attributed to the role of UNDP is notable, the sustainability of these interventions into the next parliamentary elections in Lesotho seems somewhat precarious. It is significant therefore that the CCL indicated to this Consultant that it aims to formulate an Action plan, which will take into account the need to draw funds from other donors as well. The CCL meeting of the 28-31 December, 2013 would tackle strategic planning and action planning, involving all committees of the CCL. The CCL is currently funded by the Bread for the World (German Churches) [R6.3 million, with R1.2 million coming from domestic CCL sources], while the mediation/conflict was covered by UNDP/USAID. CCL’s present funding runs for the next two years. According to CCL, these resources were not sufficient to sustain the organisation or enable it to undertake national wide conflict management/resolution/mediation processes, among other roles. Previously, the CCL would be financed for at least 4 to 5 years. The current funds would expire in December 2015. As part of its anticipated organisational set up, the CCL was planning to create a position of *Mediation Officer* to ensure that all member churches were directed and trained to undertake mediation [trainer-of-trainers courses]. Secondly, the CCL sought to diversity its activities and venture into voter and civic education in order to consolidate its role as a stabilising agency in the Lesotho political environment. The CCL emphasised that support in this regard, should take the ‘electoral cycle approach’ [i.e. supporting all relevant aspects of an electoral process, including legal, constitutional development, registration of voters, civic and voter education, campaigning, voting, post-election adjudication etc).

**21.3 Conclusion** **[Mediation]:** The Lesotho experience shows that home-grown mediation mechanisms can be viable and sustainable, if both internal and external resources are marshalled and coordinated for optimal impact. Therefore it is critical for donor organisations, including regional bodies such as SADC to invest more in these structures**.** While it is evident that the UNDP/USAID 2012 program was reactive in many ways, [understandably due to the prevailing circumstances], it is important to take note of the suggestions by CCL that the design could have benefitted from a holistic approach, involving all stakeholders including, political parties, chiefs, LCN, CCL national and regional structures, women groups, women’s leagues, youth and business in theprocess.

**22. Component 3: Capacity Development for Parliament of Lesotho**

**22.1 Activity status:** to further the capacity building objective, the program undertook expert training on budget analysis and over-sight for members of five Parliamentary Portfolio Committees. These were: the Portfolio Committee on Economic and Development Cluster, Portfolio Committee on the Social Cluster; Law and Public Safety; Natural Resources; Tourism and Land; and the Portfolio Committee on the Prime Minister’s Ministries and Departments Cluster. Each of the committees constituted 25 members. The program, using the same budget specialists, capacitated the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Due to the fact that more than 50% of MPs were new to parliament, the program ventured to improve the knowledge of MPs on the workings of parliament. It was recommended, following these interventions, that parliament’s capacity be bolstered by 1) creating a research unit [[55]](#footnote-54) 2) employing an independent budget officer/consultant (3) assisting the respective committees in evaluating quarterly reports.

As part of the capacity building initiative, UNDP also supported MPs to undertake a study tour of Canada related to the establishment of a Parliamentary Service Commission – a feature that ostensibly is aimed to enhance a clear separation between the organs of state [staff are currently designated to serve both executive and legislature]. On the invitation of the Parliament of Canada, a five-member delegation led by the Speaker of the Parliament of Lesotho Hon. Sephiri Motanyane undertook the tour on 7th June, 2013. It is understood that the preliminary outcome of the tour enabled the delegation to fully comprehend the requirements pertaining to the creation of the Parliamentary Service Commission.

The UNDP also supported the participation of the Chairman and Deputy Chair of a newly formed Senate Committee on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to participate in the Global Thematic Consultation on Governance and the Post-2015 Development Agenda, convened by the UNDP Regional Service Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa (UNDP RSC) and Pan African Parliament (PAP), from February 28th to March 2, 2013, in Midrand, South Africa. To complete the capacity inputs, staff [[56]](#footnote-55)of the Hansard (reporters/recorders) was trained in reporting techniques and a research unit was established in the fourth quarter. Technical assistance was also rendered to the Portfolio Committee on the Economic and Development Cluster in preparation of the Insurance Bill. The UNDP also reported that it had responded to requests by Parliament for expertise to install a new recording system (Taiden system).

# Findings: Capacity Development for Parliament of Lesotho

# 23.1 Performance Area I – strategy and direction

*‘The country is still behind. We got consumed in our petty bickering around politics, adversarial politics around national government forgetting we should be in government to enable people to live – that is why, with these MDGs we are so behind’, Chair, Senate MDGs Committee.*

##  Relevance and timeliness

Principal Officers in Lesotho’s bi-cameral legislature re-affirm the strategic nature of the UNDP intervention in support of the country’s Tripartite Coalition, parliament and specifically, the Portfolio Committees. Key informants indicate that the new parliament [Senate and National Assembly] needed technical capacities to track the budget process, analyse budgets and critique ministerial expenditure and audit reports, as an essential part of fostering democratic accountability. In this regard, the Clerks of the Senate and the National Assembly were in agreement that the project component supporting the consolidation of Lesotho’s eighth parliament was relevant and timely, particularly given that about half of the parliamentarians were new. [[57]](#footnote-56)Also, the realisation by interlocutors that Lesotho was lagging behind in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided a strong basis for the UNDP intervention, leading to the establishment of a dedicated MDG Committee for the Senate. [[58]](#footnote-57)

23.3 **Quality of the Project design**

The beneficiaries in this component of the project underline the quality of the project design as appropriate and tailored to the immediate needs of a nascent parliament and coalition government. UNDP not only designed the intervention but also developed TORs, provided briefings, including knowledge products and financing study tours on MDGs and the role of parliament, leveraging regional capacity [[59]](#footnote-58)to inform the whole process. The UNDP also permanently attached an officer to Senate and National Assembly to provide technical support.

This component of the program appears to have been one of the most technically demanding aspects of the entire project, which may still require constant refresher courses and regular interventions to take account of turnover of MPs. The strong assertions from key informants suggest that the intervention was long over-due and the results would bode well for the perception of parliament amongst the electorate, as an institution of accountability.

# Findings: Performance Area II – Management and Processes

## Progress

## Key factors influencing implementation

There is a convergence of opinion between the implementing agency (UNDP) and the primary beneficiaries that aspects of the project were sometimes delayed by the slow pace of decision-making processes occasioned by the complexities of the Tripartite Coalition Government. The Consultant, in relation to this assertion, again takes account of UNDP’s earlier indication that ‘over consultation’ and the lethargy and intricacy of decision making in the Tripartite Coalition government has tended to compromise the project implementation calendar.

# Findings: Performance Area III - Outputs

## Quality of work and outputs

The Senate and National Assembly spoke highly of UNDP’s experts tasked to provide training in budget analysis, budget tracking and knowledge building on MDGs as well as upgrading the recording systems of for parliamentary proceedings. The quality of this work is reflected in a demonstrated capacity by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Portfolio Committees to track and interrogate budgets and question ministerial audit reports [which will be explained in full in section 26.2]. Further, the key informants point to the work done by UNDP experts to distil what they described as ‘a complex’ *Insurance Bill* and reformulate it in ways that were better decipherable by MPs.

# Findings: Performance Areas IV / V – Uptake, Outcomes, Impacts

## Achievements and unintended results

From a technical perspective, the impact of the UNDP/USAID Program’s support to the parliament of Lesotho is reflected in the application of the skills transferred through budget training, the practical revision of parliamentary bills by experts, documentary evidence of Portfolio Committee interventions on budget issues showing recognition of key concepts (e.g. differentiation between current and capital expenditure); in addition to the corresponding content of the Hansard. [[60]](#footnote-59)

The impact of UNDP support to the National Assembly, based on beneficiary responses to this evaluation, in respect of training and technical support is catalogued as follows:

* **Budget analysis training:** Portfolio committees are now able to scrutinise budgets quarterly [as opposed to annually] a relative improvement to previous practices, which ostensibly pressurises the executive to respond on a more regular basis. According to the key informants, in the past there was hardly any scrutiny, a consequence of decades of single party and military rule that destroyed parliamentary traditions.
* **The Public Accounts Committee** (PAC), trained in budget analysis, was also in a relatively stronger position to identify problems and distinctly differentiate between figures and the need for service delivery.[[61]](#footnote-60)
* Training in budget tracking for Portfolio Committees (economic and development clusters) has left remarkable impressions [including MPs being able to respond to public telephonic inquiries on budget issues].
* Portfolio Committees could now differentiate between capital and recurrent expenditures[[62]](#footnote-61).

Further, respondents acknowledge that UNDP supported parliament in training staff for the research unit. The unit itself is yet to be fully established. At the time of this evaluation, the Senate had a senior research officer without support staff, while the National Assembly had created two research positions. There was no dedicated housing facility for the research unit and the two houses of parliament agreed that it was more prudent to consolidate resources into one composite unit. The Parliamentary Service Commission should harmonise structures, pool human and material resources, it was suggested by key informants.

UNDP expertise also assisted the Portfolio Committee responsible for the Economic Cluster to draft a ‘complex’ *Insurance Bill*. The original bill was highly technical and needed to be distilled and unpacked by a UNDP expert. In the end, as a result of expert input and elucidation to the Committee Stage [including consultations with Central Bank and others]; *59 amendments were made with the UNDP Consultant’s assistance.* The bill would soon become an Act of parliament. The result demonstrated how expert assistance enabled the whole process to be informed and rendered it easier for the Senate to review.

Finally, UNDP provided financial and technical support to upgrade faulty recording systems which were meant to improve reporting of proceedings. The equipment was only audio capable however, after financial and technical inputs [UNDP/USAID], the upgrade was on-going with the aid of a South African company. The upgraded system will ensure timely reporting, improvement to the quality of audio output and would include visuals; in addition to wiring proceedings to a Public Address (PA) System, according to key informants.

UNDP support, as stated earlier, was also extended to the Senate’s MDG Committee. The impact of UNDP assistance to the MDG Committee is largely qualitative in substance and is summed up as follows:

* Lesotho (MDG Chair) was empowered to contribute and participate in the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Assembly, promoting particularly, the notion of democratic governance as an integral part of the MDGs post 2015 [which is the anchor of the Global UNDP Dialogue which the Senate Chair attended in Johannesburg in 2013].
* The Senate MDG Committee has forged African and Global networks on MDGs and anti-corruption as a result of exposure enabled by UNDP. [[63]](#footnote-62)
* Senate Chair was able to engage with the UN Millennium Campaign on MDGs to conduct the ‘My World Survey’ on Lesotho [which measures progress on MDGs]. The UN Millennium Campaign had already sent documentation to the government to solicit its commitment. Parliament of Lesotho, was therefore taking a leading role on MDGs as a result of the UNDP support and facilitation.
* The involvement of Lesotho’s parliament in the global MDG discourse has brought to the fore the country’s performance in this regard; Its behind on MDGs 1) primary education 2) poverty 3) maternal health 4) HIV/AIDs. [[64]](#footnote-63)
* The UNDP program helped to set up an M & E framework on MDGs.[[65]](#footnote-64)

However, one of the most significant outcomes of UNDP’s interventions with Parliament relates to institutional transformation, particularly, the endorsement of the formation of the Parliamentary Service Commission by Cabinet. This will likely have major ramifications for engendering democratic accountability and promoting of the principle of separation of powers. The substantial outcomes of this activity can be summarised as follows:

* The Principal Secretary to the Ministry of the Public Service revealed that Cabinet had approved the drafting of a Bill to establish the Parliamentary Service Commission. However, technical support was needed in the drafting ‘as there is much to learn’.[[66]](#footnote-65)
* In light of the above, the UNDP support for the development of a new organogram of parliament was necessary.
* Study tours to Canada taught MPs best practice in the operations of a Parliamentary Service Commission, thereby, informing the current consensus-based outcome on its establishment in Lesotho.

## It was noted by key informants that the lack of parliamentary independence was exemplified by the fact that the institution was not in control of its own staff. Staff could be transferred, regardless of seniority, to other departments within government as they fell under the ambit of the Public Service. Currently, remuneration, delivery and discipline of parliamentary staff were the responsibility of the Public Service Commission. In this regard, the Clerks of Parliament were expected to attend meetings of the Principal Secretaries, denuding the practical application of the concept of separation of powers. [[67]](#footnote-66)The key informants noted that the issue of a Parliamentary Service Commission had ‘died’ with the last parliament but UNDP ‘has woken us up’. Because of UNDP’s intervention, consensus was reached amongst Coalition partners on the establishment of a Parliamentary Service Commission.

## Role and influence of UNDP

Although the idea of a parliamentary service commission is not new in Lesotho[[68]](#footnote-67) it is important to reiterate here that the Principal Secretary for the Public Service, the two Clerks of the Senate and National Assembly and the Chair of the MDG Committee of the Senate all reinforce the notion that this initiative was a direct result of the UNDP intervention. Key informants and official documents, underline the central role that UNDP has played in catalysing policy processes related to the formation of the Parliamentary Service Commission and therefore begin a process of assuring the independence of the legislature; the capacitation of MPs in relevant skills and the establishment of the MDG Committee. In addition to developing Results-based Work-plans, UNDP expertise formulated the Terms of Reference (TORs) for Committee and provided the necessary international exposure for its principals. Lastly, to ensure use of results, an officer was deployed to parliament to work closely with both houses – attending all of its meetings [so that all of the Senate plans could be implemented]. The UNDP/USAID Program also assisted Senate/National Assembly to familiarise themselves with the new model of government [Tripartite Coalition] as 50 percent of MPs were new and also required additional training on parliamentary procedures. [Senate has 22 chiefs and 11 professionals, so 11 members are new all the time].

## Sustainability

It remains unclear how this project will be sustained for the foreseeable future. Key informants in government, National Assembly and the Senate have all indicated there was currently no budget to support some essential components of this project, including the organisational development process for the Parliamentary Service Commission, technical support to the drafting of the Parliamentary Service Commission Bill, the establishment of a consolidated research unit for parliament, or further exposure of the MDG Committee or its expansion to encapsulate the National Assembly.

**26.5 Conclusion [Capacity Development for Parliament of Lesotho]**

Substantial local and external resources will be required to continue and sustain this process for the next two to three years which will call for innovative ways of fundraising beyond the support currently provided by UNDP/USAID. The drafting and enactment of the Parliamentary Service Commission Bill, and all technical processes preceding this, are fundamental to the consolidation of Lesotho’s governance architecture and will certainly require sustained support from government and its external partners.

# Lessons Learnt

###  Based on the fore-going, the most critical lessons learnt by the primary beneficiaries and the implementation agency on this program can be aggregated as follows:

1. Home-grown conflict mediation mechanisms are viable and should be prioritised to enable sustainability.

2. The slow pace of decision making in the Tripartite Coalition affected the implementation of the program. Partisan agenda-setting has been cited as the main cause and should be addressed.

3. Officials in the state (including government, parliament etc) need sensitisation on the central role of the IEC in sustaining political stability. Alleged ‘ignorance’ among officials of the critical nature of the institution to engendering public confidence in elections and election results detracts from the endorsement of its financial and operational autonomy.

4. The program could have benefitted more from a broad-based approach which includes stakeholders at various levels of society, given that conflict occurs in the realm of the social, the economic and the political, at national, regional and community. [However, the limitations and unexpected nature of the problem has been well understood and appreciated].

# Summary and Recommendations

## There is no doubt that the beneficiaries regard the program as an absolutely vital intervention for the sustenance of Lesotho’s current Tripartite Coalition and future formations. The unanimous view is that program support should continue, particularly since the problems thus far identified are of a long term nature and will require nurturing into the next elections and beyond. However, there are a number of fundamental requirements which may determine the endurance of this program which are strategic and financial in context. Firstly, it is apparent that consensus building is a long term enterprise and will need several cycles of support to deepen. Secondly, capacity building also entails sustained efforts: In this sense, it requires refresher courses in mediation, budget skills and knowledge building in these and related fields for legislators and a wide range of civic groups. The turn-over of MPs in parliament renders such regular interventions an absolute necessity as new entrants will need similar training. Also, to strengthen social accountability, non-state actors will need to be trained in budget skills in addition to a broader dispensation of mediation pedigrees. All these necessitate long term and sustainable financing. To this end, the following is recommended:

* 1. That **Long Term support** (3 to 5 years) should be extended to the Lesotho Consensus Electoral Reform Program owing to the tenuous nature of the political environment in the country.
	2. **Broad-based approach**: The next phase of the program, should it be approved, must consider embracing a wider pool of stakeholders, including traditional rulers, business leaders, youth, women, nomadic communities and other special groups, to address all the key antecedents that contribute to conflict at all levels of society. This approach will inform the creation of a holistic long term program for Lesotho that takes into account the inter-related political, economic social, cultural and environmental causes of conflict.
	3. **Local resources and sustainability:** There is need for initiatives for raising alternative sources of funding by the Government of Lesotho.. UNDP can play an important role in providing experts to train the relevant staff and leadership of government in Domestic Resource Mobilisation (DRM) approaches to enable the development of a self-financing local conflict mediation architecture. External funding should be a complementary option.
	4. **Technical support:** UNDP’s continued technical input in the finalisation of the PMS is direly needed for the Government of Lesotho. The strides made so far are very encouraging but the technical deficits highlighted by the Ministry of the Public Service are indicative of the urgent need to maintain the momentum and finalise all relevant tools. This includes technical support for the drafting of relevant legislation and the development of a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework.
	5. **Training non-coalition parties:** UNDP’s coalition building work needs to be extended to non-coalition political parties to ensure the internalisation of the tenets amongst a broader pool of key actors, given that any of the political parties can be potentially regarded as a future coalition partner. It is certain from this evaluation that there is a still a lot to be done to build trust and confidence between coalition partners, let alone enable awareness-raising amongst the opposition and ‘block’ parties as such. To this end, interventions of this nature should deliberately and consistently embrace non-coalition parties so that the tenets of coalition management become entrenched more broadly.
	6. The **National Assembly** should have a dedicated MDGs Committee which specifically tackles critical issues and fosters accountability in this area. The Social Cluster Committees are too generic to serve as a substitute for a dedicated MDG Committee. Further support to the Senate and the National Assembly to expand knowledge and skills around the inter-face between governance and MDGs is essential if Lesotho is to competently contribute to the UNDP’s *MDGs Post 2015 Agenda.*
	7. **IEC autonomy:** Leadership awareness and public education on the pivotal role the IEC plays in a democracy should be integrated into training programs for stakeholders: [A critical mass supporting a fully independent and autonomous IEC answerable to parliament rather than the executive can be garnered this way].
	8. UNDP’s **organisational capacity development**, of the type rendered to the CCL, should be extended to other central non-state actors to tailor their institutional set ups to the demands of present-day Lesotho, in addition to to ensuring the mainstreaming and institutionalisation of mediation skills in the programming of local interlocutors. Sustainability of programs such as these will depend partly on continued capacity development in this and other related areas.
	9. The program lacks a **substantial media-based intervention** **on conflict.** Awareness of the tenets of conflict mediation and particularly communication related modules need to be developed to ensure that media messaging consistently embraces the nation building symbolism akin to the consensus-building context pervading Lesotho at present. [From the experience of other conflict countries, media have either exacerbated conflict through the amplification of ethnically inclined hate speech, partisanship and by sheer lack of essential knowledge of key issues].

End.

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**APPENDIX ONE**

**KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS, 10 to 20 DECEMBER, 2013. FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE UNDP/USAID POST ELECTIONS SUPPORT PROGRAMME**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Hounorable Futho Hoohlo MP,  | Senate, Parliament of Lesotho | Chairman of the Senate Committee on MDGs | Cell: 266 5888 3294futho@ananzi.co.za |
| Mr. Khotso Manamolela, Senate Office | The Senate  | Clerk of the Senate | kmanamolela@hotmail.comCell: 266 588 22 44 |
| Mr. Mphasa Mokhochane, IEC Offices | IEC of Lesotho | Director of Elections | (deputised) |
| Ms Pontso Mmatierie Matete | IEC of Lesotho | Executive Manager, IEC Lesotho; | Tel: 266 2231 4991Fax: 266 2231 0398 |
| Ms Itumeleng Malefa Mosala | IEC of Lesotho | Human Resource Executive, IEC Lesotho | Tel: 266 2231 4991Fax: 266 2231 0398 |
| Sofonea Shale | Development for Peace Education (DPE) | Programme Coordinator, Development for Peace Education (DPE), TRC Offices | shalesofonea@yahoo.com |
| Mr. Thabiso Mokobori and his Deputy  | Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL), | General Secretary  | generalsecretary@ccl.orgmokobiri@hotmail.comCell: 266 62500483 |
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**APPENDIX TWO**

# QUESTIONAIRE A: GOVERNMENT & POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES

# INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: COALITION BUILDING

**Strategy/direction:**

1. How relevant, if at all, was UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program to the needs of government, parliament and Lesotho as a country after the 2012 parliamentary elections?
2. In your view, was the program aligned to the needs of stakeholders, [particularly the state institutions]? **(Inclusiveness)**
3. Which significant outcome would you directly attribute to UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform?
4. Generally, in what ways has the program been responsible for the following factors, if at all?

a) Increasing the number of political actors, MPs, CSOs, who understand and implement the basic principles of coalition government building?

b) Improving the functional relationships between the various minority parties

c) Increasing the number of political parties and civil society actors who adopt reconciliation and mediation as a component of successful political transition.

**Quality and Credibility:**

What specific interventions have made a difference [if at all] in increasing knowledge on the understanding and implementation of basic principles of coalition government building?

What specific interventions have made a difference [if at all] in improving the functional relationships between the various minority parties?

What specific interventions have made a difference [if at all] i.e. Increasing the number of political parties and civil society actors who adopt reconciliation and mediation as a component of successful political transition.

To what extent did the cabinet retreat contribute to strengthening the coalition and in rendering better understanding of roles, responsibilities and the need for effective service delivery (if at all).

[In what ways did the training for party leaders held at the Maseru Sun in December this year, contribute to this cause?]

**Uptake/Impact:**

Quality: how relevant was the content on Performance Management Systems (PMS) training?

Have the outcomes of the PMS training been applied? If so, in what ways?

Can the presence of strategic plans in government departments be directly attributed to UNDP’s capacity input on the PMS training? **[tangible evidence to be requested]**

Were there any negative effects resulting from UNDP/donor support to election related activities in 2012/2013?

What are the lessons learnt from this program and how can future interventions build on it?

**Did the PMS achieve the following:**

1. Common understanding of the strategic priorities of the Coalition Government, in context of the on-going Development Plan;
2. Assessment of governance and service delivery challenges facing Lesotho and options for addressing them;
3. Common understanding of the roles of Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Principal Secretaries and steps to ensure accountability and performance of these strategic –level officers; and
4. Increased trust and improved relationships amongst members of Government, resulting in improved ability to deliver effective, people-centred Coalition Government.

**(verification: outcomes/decisions through minutes, issued decrees of parliament etc)**

**QUESTIONAIRE B**

**IMMEDIATE POST ELECTION SUPPORT TO THE IEC**

1. How did the activities funded/supported by UNDP – either directly or indirectly - contribute towards the delivery of free, fair and credible elections?
2. In what ways – if any – did the UNDP and other donor funded activities contribute to the consolidation of the acceptance of the 2012 election results?
3. Which significant outcome (in the IEC institutional capacity or electoral reform) would you directly attribute to UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program?
4. Explain the impact, if any, of the following interventions undertaken by UNDP in the 2012/2013 period in support of the IEC and the electoral process:
5. Developing IEC strategic plan
6. Gender mainstreaming
7. Developing new voter registration models
8. Review of the electoral process and legal and constitutional framework
9. How many election-related recommendations arising from the UNDP project were successfully adopted by the Government of Lesotho (Gol) and the IEC (after election review, 2012)?
10. Has the IEC/state implemented the recommendations contained in the Beale report (IEC accountable to parliament; organizational capacity and IT development)
11. What were the key lessons learnt from the tour of Botswana, South Africa and Zambia? How were the lessons applied?
12. Was the UNDP/donor community’s reaction to various stages of the 2012 electoral process appropriate and timely?
13. Were there any negative effects resulting from UNDP/donor support to election-related activities?

9. What lessons can be learnt from the experience of the 2012 elections and the UNDP Program?

9. What funding areas are recommended for future programming support in order to enhance the electoral process?

# QUESTIONAIRE C

# INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CCL AND CSOs

1. What activities did UNDP/USAID funding make possible in the 2012 Lesotho parliamentary elections?

2. Which positive aspects of the 2012 elections can you directly (or indirectly) attribute to UNDP supported activities in your organisation?

3. What, in your view, was the most significant outcome of UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program launched in August 2012?

4. Was your organisation’s capacity enhanced in any way as a result of the training/funding you received from UNDP?

 5. How many mediation events were held as a result of UNDP training?

 6. How many dialogue events between political parties; and between government and civil society were facilitated by CCL as a result of UNDP support in 2012/2013? **(Review minutes of events, project reports, attendance registers/confirmations).**

5 Describe how the UNDP training contributed to the following, if at all:

1. Building confidence, trust between political parties
2. Dispute resolution
3. Consolidation of the acceptance of the 2012 election results
4. Enabling/consolidating the tripartite coalition?
5. How do you compare the CCL’s capacity to mediate conflict prior to the UNDP capacity building activities, to the period after UNDP training?

**INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT**

1. UNDP has provided technical support to CCL in developing a new constitution, policy documents and organisational structure. Could you comment on the following:
2. The timing of the support and how it may or may not have improved your role as a mediator/ or operations
3. Relevance, [to what extent it met your needs]
4. Quality, [was the technical support able to substantially change the strategic approach of your organisation?].

11. Were there any negative effects resulting from UNDP/donor support to election-related activities?

**12.What were lessons learnt from the 2012 elections and your role as a mediating institution?**

13.Would you recommend continued support from UNDP and other donors in the area of conflict mediation, political consolidation and good governance? (if so, why?).

**QUESTIONAIRE D: IMMEDIATE POST ELECTION SUPPORT TO PARLIAMENT**

1. What activities did UNDP/donor funding make possible in the 2012 Lesotho parliamentary elections?
2. Which positive aspects of the 2012 elections can you directly (or indirectly) attribute to UNDP supported activities in parliament?
3. What, in your view, was the most significant outcome of UNDP’s Lesotho Consensus and Electoral Reform Program launched in August 2012?
4. Was your parliament’s capacity enhanced in any way as a result of the training/funding you received from UNDP?
5. How has the work of the Parliamentary Accounts Committee benefitted from this program, if at all? (i.e. employing budget officer, assist with budget execution)
6. Briefly explain what the impact of the following interventions in the work of parliamentarians was (if any):
7. Budget analysis & tracking **(quarterly vs annual tracking of budget?)**
8. Coalition building
9. Training of Hansard staff
10. Establishing a research unit (are staff in place, library, housing)
11. Technical assistance to Parliamentary Portfolio Committees
12. Is there a training plan for the Speaker, MPs and Deputy Clerk in place (arising from the UNDP program)?
13. How many trainings & study tours were held for the executive leadership of parliament?
14. To what extent would you attribute the steps taken so far toward the establishment of a Parliamentary Service Commission, to the UNDP Program?
15. In relation to this, how did the UNDP sponsored study tour to Canada (on the establishment of Parliamentary Service Commission) contribute towards this goal?
16. What is the progress on the adoption of a Parliamentary Service Commission??
17. Is there a Bill seeking to establish the commission in this regard?
18. In what ways, if any, did UNDP support improve parliamentary capacity to understand and apply knowledge on commitments and attainment of the MDGs (post-2015)?
19. What were the lessons learnt from the 2012 elections and from the UNDP support to parliament?
20. Were there any negative effects resulting from UNDP/donor support to election-related activities?

**Would you recommend continued support from UNDP and other donors in the area of conflict mediation, political consolidation and good governance? (if so, why, and what specific areas?)**

1. The PS in the Ministry of the Public Service explained that the Health and Foreign Affairs Ministries were still to develop their own strategic plans because their ministries had ‘complex issues’ to deal with. Sample copy of Performance Agreement was provided by PS Public Service. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Empirical evidence of participants’ satisfaction with the quality, relevance and strategic nature of the course, shows for instance that 91% (10 of 11 participants, senior party officials and MPs) in a post workshop feedback expressed positive views of the knowledge gained. [The Workshop titled *‘Coalition Building and Strengthening the Role of Political Parties in Parliament of Lesotho’* was held on 11-13 December, 2013, in Lesotho. Post workshop was obtained for the purposes of this evaluation in collaboration with the workshop facilitator. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Christian Council of Lesotho.2012.Post 2007 General Elections Political Dialogue in Lesotho: Report by the Heads of Churches in Lesotho, presented to the SADC on the 25th of August, 2012, Windhoek, Namibia. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Christian Council of Lesotho.2013. 2nd Amendments [Amendment to the Constitution]. Maseru: CCL.

See also: Christian Council of Lesotho.2013.Constitution Amendments Presented by Member Churches and Organisations. Maseru: CCL [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Beale. S.2012.Evaluation of the Lesotjho 2012 National Assembly Elections. Maseru: UNDP. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. It is important to reiterate here that the Principal Secretary for the Public Service, the two Clerks of the Senate and National Assembly and the Chair of the MDG Committee of the Senate all reinforce the notion that this initiative was a direct result of the UNDP intervention. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. UNDP/USAID Project documents [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. 2012-2013 Quarterly USAID Report on post elections support [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. UNDP evaluation template and quality standards. http://web.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/annex [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. House R.E. & Howe R.K.2000.Deliberative Democratic Evaluation checklist. www.wmich.edu/evactr/checlists [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. House R.E. & Howe R.K.2000.Deliberative Democratic Evaluation checklist. www.wmich.edu/evactr/checlists. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Babbie E. & Mouton J. 2008. The Practice of Social Research. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Patton (2003) is instructive in this regard: the analyst in this sense will seek to know whether the evidence is consistent in support of the findings; the extent to which the findings deepen knowledge of the program under evaluation; the extent to which ther findings are consistent with other knowledge (confirmatory significance); to what extent are the findings useful for the evaluation’s purpose. (Patton M.Q.2003.Qualitative Evaluation Checklist. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Following with the UNDP Program manager, the methodology was adjusted to three approaches. In lieu of a dissemination workshop, the report would be circulated to the stakeholders as has been the case with other evaluations to elicit further inputs, where relevant. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. [www.afrea.org](http://www.afrea.org). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Retrieved on 5 Dec, 2013. [O] [www.wmich.edu/evalctr/checklists](http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/checklists). Evaluation Centre, University of Western Michigan. September 2003 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Beale, S.2012.Evaluation of the Lesotho 2012 National Assembly Elections. Maseru: UNDP. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. As a result of the MMP electoral model, the Parliament of the Kingdom of Lesotho comprises two houses, the National Assembly, which constitutes 120 elected members (80+40) of Parliament based on the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), and the Senate that is composed of 33 members, 22 of whom are hereditary Principal Chiefs and the other 11 nominated by the King on the advice of the Council of State. The role of the Council is to advise and assist the King in the discharge of his functions as spelled by the constitution. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
20. Kapa (2012) observed that the MMP model was itself, contestable as there is a melange of mixed systems in operation globally, some with the FPTP and Proportional components managed as a composite system (proportional variant), while other employs the FPTP and PR as *parallel* systems managed separately. The proportional MMP model is adjudged to be more equitable and therefore favours the inclusion of smaller political parties. Chirambo, k.2008.The Political Cost of AIDS in Africa. London: Africa Books Collective. Also see Kapa, M.A.2012.The Lesotho 2012 National Elections: Lessons Learnt. Maseru: UNDP [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
21. ibid. see also: Government of Lesotho: Report of the High Level Induction and Planning Program for Hon. Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Principal Secretaries, held at Berea, June 17-19, 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
22. Document for the Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance (CDGG) in Lesotho Programme. Maseru: UNDP/Irish AID [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
23. Beale, S.2013.Evaluation of the Lesotho 2012 National Assembly Elections. Maseru: UNDP. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
24. UNDP.2012-2013 First Quarterly USAID Report on post elections support. Maseru: UN.

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UNDP.2012-2013 Fourth Quarterly USAID Report on post elections support. Maseru: UN. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
25. According to the IEC, the sub component on gender mainstreaming was supported under the CDGG program and was therefore not part of this evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
26. Program indicators in appendix. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
27. Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho.2012. Zambia, Botswana & South Africa Study Tour Report on Registration of Electors, 25th November to 4th December Maseru: IEC & Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho.2012.Re-registration Progress/status.2012. Maseru: IEC. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
28. See Individual Consultants Procurement Notice, UNDP; and Summary changes in the revised rules of Individual Contractors, UNDP 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
29. According to the IEC Key Informants, presently, the IEC is financed directly by the executive, and reports to Government.] [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
30. IEC.2012.Zambia, Botswana and South Africa Study Tour Report on Registration of Electors [25 November to 4 December, 2012] [ICE: 31-32]. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
31. Interview with Ms Pontso Mmatierie Matete, Executive Manager, IEC Lesotho; Ms Itumeleng Malefa Mosala, Human Resource Executive, IEC Lesotho**.** Correlated to 2013- 4TH Quarter Report: Post-election support-Consensus Building and Electoral reform in Lesotho. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
32. Interview with Ms Pontso Mmatierie Matete, Executive Manager, IEC Lesotho; Ms Itumeleng Malefa Mosala, Human Resource Executive, IEC Lesotho**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
33. In this regard, it was suggested that commissioners be exposed to the programmes of the Electoral Commissioners Forum of SADC Countries (ECF-SADC). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
34. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
35. Government of Lesotho.2013.Report of the High Level Induction and Planning Program for Hon. Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Principal Secretaries, held at Berea, June 17-19, 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
36. UNDP.2012-2013 First Quarterly USAID Report on post elections support. Maseru: UN.

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UNDP.2012-2013 Third Quarterly USAID Report on post elections support. Maseru: UN.

UNDP.2012-2013 Fourth Quarterly USAID Report on post elections support. Maseru: UN. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
37. ‘All people who voted want positions when there is regime change’, One respondent noted**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
38. Interview: PS, Public Service, Lesotho. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
39. While both UNDP and the Principal Secretary in the Public Service Ministry agree on the ‘over consultation’ and its effects on programming, the Consultant notes that the interpretation of ‘progress’ varies: The PS states for instance that the Coalition operates on a gentleman’s agreements [‘I can’t say we have moved much’]. While, UNDP states: It was a gentleman’s agreement as it’s not provided for in constitution. PM has to consult with coalition partners for decisions [but we have made a lot of progress]. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
40. UNDP notes that Gol’s ‘regimented approach’ such as attending to set agendas as the national budget, also affected their own time-frames. The larger part of the delays, it was noted, was mainly due to ‘reasons best known to themselves’ [Coalition partners]. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
41. Note: Through consultations and collaboration with the facilitator of the workshop titled*‘Coalition Building and Strengthening the Role of Political Parties in Parliament of Lesotho’*, held on 11-13 December, 2013, in Lesotho, a post workshop evaluation was done for the purposes of this evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
42. The PS Public Service explained that the Health and Foreign Affairs Ministries were still to develop their own strategic plans because their ministries had ‘complex issues’ to deal with. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
43. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
44. Interview, Chair of the MDGs Committee. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
45. According to PS Public Service, government had benefitted from presentations by experts from the Presidency in South Africa [whose M&E is located in the Office of Minister Trevor Manuel] and New Zealand [which has a coalition government and an MMP model similar to Lesotho’s]. New Zealand expert also spoke on depoliticization of the civil service. The workshop benefitted also from presentations from government experts from Kenya. The models were not exactly the same, as while in some countries, M& E units were located at the highest level, such as in South Africa, in others, this was not the case. Lesotho still needs to negotiate these complexities in order to agree on a workable model, it was noted. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
46. The CCL claims to represent 90% of Christian population and is made of the Anglican Church, Catholic Church, the Presbyterian Church, Methodists Church and African Methodist Church.) [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
47. Interview with CCL and DPE Secretariats. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
48. Interview: DPE Secretariat: UNDP hired respected international Electoral Systems expert [Professor Andrew Reynolds]. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
49. CCL indicates: ‘It seems also, as if we have 3 PMs – PM is from ABC, Deputy PM from LCD and Minister of Gender, Sport and Recreation –BNP’. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
50. The impact of this meeting was not able to be independently verified due to the constraints of unavailability of the participants at the time of the evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
51. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
52. Christian Council of Lesotho.2013. 2nd Amendments [Amendment to the Constitution]. Maseru: CCL.

See also: Christian Council of Lesotho.2013.Constitution Amendments Presented by Member Churches and Organisations. Maseru: CCL [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
53. Christian Council of Lesotho.2013. Assessment Report and the OCA Review. Maseru: CCL. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
54. Christian Council of Lesotho.2013.Draft 2: Strategic Plan, 2013-2017. Maseru: CCL. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
55. [The Association of West European Parliamentarians with Africa –AWEPA - had completed training modules in this regard]. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
56. UNDP indicated that 3 Hansard staff members left for Johannesburg on 9 December to 24 December, 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
57. Interview: Mr Khotso Manamolela, Clerk a.i. of the Senate of Lesotho.Advocate Lebohang Fine Maema, Clerk of the National Assembly and Mr Masito Lelimo, Assistant Clerk of the National Assembly. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
58. Interview: Hon. Futho Hoohlo, Chair of the MDG Committee of the Senate and Secretary General of the ABC party; and Member of the Business Committee. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
59. As indicated earlier, the UNDP sponsored the Chair of the MDGs committee and senators to attend UNDP/Pan African Parliament (PAP) Regional Consultations in Midrand on MDGs Post 2015.

 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
60. Interview: Clerk of the National Assembly, Advocate Lebohang Fine Maema, See also, Nyeoe. T & Koatsa N. 2012. Training for Portfolio Committees: Budget Analysis and Oversight. Maseru: National Assembly of Lesotho. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
61. National Assembly of Lesotho.2013.Review of Performance for the First Quarter of the Fiscal Year 2013/2014 by the Portfolio Committee on the Prime Minister’s Ministries and Departments Cluster. Maseru: National Assembly.

National Assembly of Lesotho.2013.Review of Performance for the First Quarter of the Fiscal Year 2013/2014 by the Portfolio Committee on the Social Cluster. Maseru: National Assembly.

National Assembly of Lesotho.2013.Report of the Portfolio Committee on the Economic and Development Cluster on the Insurance Bill, 2013. Maseru: National Assembly.

National Assembly of Lesotho.2013. Daily Hansard (Official Report), Third Meeting, First Session, Monday, 25 November, 2013. Maseru: National Assembly of Lesotho. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
62. See proceedings of Daily Hansard (Official Report), Third Meeting, First Session, Monday, 25 November, 2013. Maseru: National Assembly of Lesotho. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
63. The exposure enabled by UNDP allowed the Senate to be aware of; and join the African Parliamentary Network on MDGs. [‘a very important tool’], Interview: Senate MDG Chair. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
64. In this regard, the Chair of the Senate MDG Committee noted that the Ministry of Development in Lesotho had no capacity at all – ‘it does not know much about MDGs. The Senate and parliament need to work in tandem with Ministry to achieve these goals’ [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
65. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
66. The Clerk of the Senate and the National Assembly, both confirm that they have received a directive on the establishment of PSC from cabinet. The Office of Clerk would work on the content of the PSC bill and related bills. Clerks of N/Assembly and Senates will follow up on the transition from public service to Parliamentary Service Commission. Six staff members [three each from Senate and Assembly] had been appointed to draft the instructions for the bill. [‘What we want the bill to look like’]. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
67. [If Parliament were independent, the executive and assemblies would only exchange information. In the past, parliament used to be a ‘rubber stamp’ now, there are improvements, including participation of various stakeholders in its affairs, one key informant observed. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
68. According to UNDP, the President of the Senate and Speaker of the National Assembly had both proposed the establishment of the Parliamentary Service Commission. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)